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PUBLICATION OVERVIEW
The main body of this thesis comprises the following publications:
Chapter 2 of this dissertation comprises two related works.
Sections 2.1 - 2.6 are a joint paper with Professor Dennis J. Snower, Ph.D.
entitled “Envy, Guilt, and the Phillips curve.” This paper has been pub-
lished in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, volume 99, March
2014, pages 69-84. My contribution to this paper has been the literature re-
view, the formulation of the theoretical model and the simulation exercises,
including writing the source codes. The editorial work as well as the intu-
itions for the result stem from joint efforts. The journal article is available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.015.
Sections 2.8 and 2.9 is based on my single-authored working paper “Inequal-
ity Aversion and the Long-Run Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: Bilateral ver-
sus Group Comparison,” which is provided by the Kiel Institute for the World
Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1802. The permanent
download to the original working paper is available at:
http://ideas.repec.org/p/kie/kieliw/1802.html.
For this thesis, I have extended Chapter 2 by subsection 2.7, which elaborates
on footnote 21 in “Envy, Guilt, and the Phillips curve” and footnote 10 in “In-
equality Aversion and the Long-Run Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: Bilateral
versus Group Comparison.”
Chapter 3 is based on the working paper entitled “Loss Averse Consumers:
An Alternative Theory of Price Adjustment,” which is joint with Diplom Volks-
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wirtin Inske Pirschel and Professor Dennis J. Snower, Ph.D. The original paper
is provided by Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its
series Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regula-
tion in a Global Economic Order with number 79793. My personal contribution
to this project includes the simulation exercise, including writing the source
codes and running the simulations. Furthermore, I generally contributed to
the literature review, the mathematical formulation of the theoretical model,
and the intuition of the results. The original working paper is available at:
http://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/vfsc13/79793.html.
Chapter 4 is derived from the paper “Estimating a high-frequency New-Keynes-
ian Phillips curve,” which is joint work with Dr. Stephen Sacht. This pa-
per has been published in Empirical Economics, volume 46, issue 2, March
2014, pages 607-628. My contribution to this project lies primarily in provid-
ing the initial idea and the empirical part of the paper. The latter comprises,
e.g., collecting and processing the data, performing the estimations, and com-
puting the various test statistics. The theoretical part has to be attributed
to my co-author. All remaining parts (i.e. editorial work, result discussion,
and conclusions) have been joint efforts. The journal article is available at:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-013-0684-7.
Chapter 5 is joint work with Dr. Matthias Hartmann from Heidelberg Uni-
versity. The paper is entitled “State-dependence vs. Time-dependence: An
Empirical Multi-Country Investigation of Price Sluggishness” and it is pro-
vided by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Work-
ing Papers with number 1802. While the estimation and testing procedures
have been performed by Dr. Hartmann, my contribution to this project has
been the underlying intuition, which includes providing the initial idea and
the model framework, as well as providing substantial parts of the macroe-
conomic discussion. Furthermore, I provided the data work (collecting and
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processing the data) for this project. The editorial work has been a joint ef-
fort. The permanent download to the original working paper is available at:
http://ideas.repec.org/p/kie/kieliw/1907.html.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with preferences, nominal rigidities, and their inter-
action with monetary policy. Monetary policy is one off the most extensively
studied topics in contemporary macroeconomics. At the core of this research
area lies the instrumental use of monetary policy to influence macroeconomic
activity. This question comprises two dimensions: First, monetary policy as an
instrument to stabilize business cycle fluctuations in the short run and, second,
monetary policy as an instrument to permanently foster real macroeconomic
activity in the long run. As we will show in this thesis, the way preferences
and nominal rigidities are modeled, can highly influence the effectiveness of
monetary policy both, in the short- and in the long-run.
The workhorse model for monetary policy analysis is the New Keynesian
model (henceforth: NKM). The textbook version of the NKM (see, e.g., Wood-
ford, 2003; Gal´ı, 2008; Walsh, 2010) places rational, self-centered, self-interested
agents into an economic environment of monopolistic competition. Agents de-
rive their decisions from maximizing forward-looking objective-functions which
focus on materialistic values, i.e. firms maximize their current and future ex-
pected profits, while households maximize their current and future expected
utilities which they derive from consumption and leisure. Monetary authorities
conduct monetary policy either by interest rate or money supply management.
What makes this model “Keynesian” is that agents are restricted in their price
and wage setting decisions and therefore prices and wages do not react flexibly
and instantly to every change in the economic environment. As a consequence
of these nominal rigidities monetary policy exhibits some influence on the real
sector of the economy. If nominal prices and wages were to adjust immediately
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and fully to changes in monetary policy instruments, the classical dichotomy
(by which monetary policy is neutral with respect to real variables) would be
restored. Against this background, this thesis takes an alternative view on
preferences and nominal rigidities and studies their implications for monetary
policy. While the alternative view on preferences provides rationales for long-
run effects of monetary policy and endogenous price stickiness, the alternative
view on nominal rigidities challenges the time-dependent pricing paradigm and
questions the high degree of nominal inertia estimated from quarterly data. As
will be shown, each of these results has far reaching implications for the conduct
of monetary policy analysis. The analysis in this thesis consists of two parts: a
theoretical part and an empirical part.
The theoretical part of this thesis breaks with the traditional preference
structure. The notion of homo-economicus has been refuted by a massive em-
pirical literature. Inspired by the tremendous success in the field of behavioral
and experimental economics, we assume that some market participants follow
an alternative behavioral paradigm, namely reference-dependent preferences.
With reference-dependent preferences, agents evaluate outcomes relative to a
reference point, rather than by its face value. Reference-dependent preferences
help explain “anomalistic” behavior such as the equity premium puzzle, the dis-
position effect, downward-sloping labor supply curves, asymmetric price elas-
ticities in consumer goods, status-quo bias, or endowment effects, which still
remain puzzles for homo-economicus (Camerer, 2000; Ho et al., 2006). In this
thesis, we show that reference-dependent preferences can also be used to pro-
vide novel rationales for the long-run non-neutrality of monetary policy and for
microfounded nominal rigidities.
We model reference-dependent preferences along two different lines, differing
by the notion of their reference point. In Chapter 2 we substitute selfish prefer-
ences with fairness preferences. As a consequence, agents are no longer purely
self-interested but other-regarding, i.e. an agent’s well-being depends on the
outcomes of others. The notion of fairness that we apply in Chapter 2 is based
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on inequality aversion, a phenomenon covering both envy and guilt. We model
inequality aversion along the lines of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) and incorporate it into an otherwise standard NKM with tem-
porarily fixed nominal wage contracts and positive inflation. This approach has
far reaching implications for the conduct of monetary policy. These implications
are in conflict with monetary policy recommendations from standard economic
theory, according to which monetary policy is (almost) neutral with respect to
aggregate employment and output in the long run for low inflation rates.1
This changes dramatically under reference-dependent preferences. In the
presence of temporarily fixed nominal wage contracts, positive inflation implies
that real wages decline over the contract period. Since different workers write
nominal wage contracts at different times, this leads to real wage dispersion and
thus dispersion of real incomes. In the presence of inequality aversion, workers
with relatively low incomes experience envy, whereas those with relatively high
incomes experience guilt. The former seek to raise their income and the latter
seek to reduce it. The greater the inflation rate, the greater the degree of wage
dispersion under nominal wage contracts, and thus the greater the degree of
envy and guilt experienced by the workers. Since the envy effect is stronger
than the guilt effect, according to the available empirical evidence, a rise in the
inflation rate leads workers to supply more labor over the contract period, gener-
ating a significant positive long-run relation between inflation and output (and
employment), for low inflation rates. This adds a theoretically novel trans-
mission channel to the standard model, by which monetary policy positively
influences macroeconomic activity in the long run. As we show, this transmis-
sion channel dominates all inefficiencies, which arise from real wage dispersion,
for inflation rates up to 4% (given standard calibrations). Consequently, the
Phillips curve is backward-bending, so that increases in money growth lead to
1While standard economic theory follows the conventional wisdom that the classical dichotomy
holds, this is true only approximately for the standard NKM. While the NKM, qualitatively,
implies a non-neutrality of monetary policy due to time discounting and inefficiencies due to
relative price instability, quantitatively, these effects are negligibly small for reasonable values
of the interest rate and low inflation rates (Ascari, 1998; Graham and Snower, 2004; Levin
and Yun, 2007).
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higher employment and output at low inflation, but to lower employment and
output at high inflation. Provided that wage adjustments are costly, this trade-
off remains significant even once the degree of wage stickiness adjusts to the
inflation rate. This Phillips curve relation, together with an inefficient zero-
inflation steady state, provides a rationale for a positive long-run inflation rate.
Given standard calibrations, optimal monetary policy is associated with a long-
run inflation rate around 2 percent. This policy recommendation is particularly
noteworthy, since it helps bridge the gap between monetary theory and central
banking practice. In contrast to much of the recent literature on monetary pol-
icy, according to which the optimal inflation target of the central bank ranges
between zero and the Friedman rule (i.e. the inflation rate is minus the real
interest rate), we provide a rationale for targeting inflation at a low, positive
rate. Therefore, Chapter 2 shows how the policy implication for the monetary
authorities changes dramatically in the light of a decision making process, which
is influenced by reference-dependent preferences.
While preferences in Chapter 2 depend on interpersonal comparison of per-
ceived outcomes, preferences in Chapter 3 depend on intrapersonal comparison
of perceived outcomes. In particular, Chapter 3 challenges the standard as-
sumption from expected utility theory that preferences do not depend on cur-
rent “assets” (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).
Numerous empirical evidence supports the notion that utility is determined by
gains and losses relative to a reference point rather than by plain levels. For
intrapersonal comparisons such reference points often take the form of past,
present, or future expected outcomes; or a combination of those. In Chapter 3
of this thesis, we resort to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1984) concept of loss
aversion, which not only includes gains and losses as a means of evaluation, but
also asserts that losses loom larger than gains. We incorporate consumer loss
aversion in the price dimension into an otherwise standard neoclassical model
of monopolistic competition and study the price setting behavior of the monop-
olistic competitive firm, facing loss averse consumers. Due to loss aversion in
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the price dimension, the consumers’ perceived utility losses from price increases
are weighted more heavily than the perceived utility gains from price decreases
of equal magnitude. Price changes are evaluated relative to an endogenous ref-
erence price, which is an agent’s rational price expectation from the recent past
(Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006). By implication, demand responses are more elastic
for price increases than for price decreases and thus firms face a downward-
sloping demand curve that is kinked at the consumers’ reference price. The
resulting theory of price adjustment is starkly at variance with past neoclas-
sical and Keynesian theories. First, although the firm is generally capable to
flexibly change prices at no costs, full price flexibility is no optimal behavior.
Under all circumstances considered in Chapter 3, prices react less pronounced
to demand shocks relative to the standard neoclassical model of monopolistic
competition. Therefore, the assumption of loss averse consumers generates an
endogenous mechanism of state-dependent price sluggishness derived completely
from microfoundations. Second, and in contrast to the Keynesian theories of
price rigidity, our theory captures empirically observed asymmetric price reac-
tions to positive and negative shocks, which can be reconciled with the standard
theories of price adjustment only under restrictive ad-hoc assumptions.
The theoretical part of this thesis concludes that changes of the preference
structure taken from recent advances in the behavioral economics literature can
have major effects for decision making. These effects are of importance not only
for the individualistic behavior but also for macroeconomic policy makers.
While the theoretical part of this thesis looks at adjustments on the house-
hold side of the economy, the empirical part analyzes solely the firm side of the
economy. In the focus of the second part of this thesis lies the estimation of the
structural short-run New Keynesian Phillips curve (henceforth: NKPC), derived
from Calvo (1983) price setting. In the short run, the NKPC is upward-sloping
in the inflation-employment space, giving rise to a tradeoff between inflation
and the real side of the economy. To quantitatively assess this tradeoff from a
macroeconomic perspective, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) estimate the slope of the
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short-run NKPC from quarterly time series data by means of the generalized
method of moments (henceforth: GMM). This procedure allows immediate in-
ference on the degree of nominal inertia, measured by the Calvo parameter.
Following their pathbreaking contribution, NKPCs have been estimated for the
majority of the industrialized and emerging economies. The resulting macroe-
conometric estimates are, however, often way out of line with microeconometric
evidence on price stickiness (Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2007; Kuester et al., 2009).
In Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, two deviations from the standard estimation
procedure in the literature are considered, which help realign the macroeconomic
estimates with microeconometric evidence.
The first deviation is concerned with the extend of nominal inertia, found
in the data. While microeconometric evidence predicts prices to be fixed on av-
erage around half a year in the United States (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Klenow
and Kryvtsov, 2008), macroeconometric evidence often finds average durations
of sticky prices of well above one year (Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999; Gal´ı et al., 2001,
2003; Nason and Smith, 2008). Consequently, Phillips curves estimated from
macroeconomic data seem to be too flat, which entails the risk of overstating
the effectiveness of monetary policy. This divergence may be brought about
by the different frequencies of analysis. While micro-price studies are generally
performed on a daily to monthly basis, the estimation of NKPCs via GMM is
generally conducted in a quarterly setting. Chapter 4 intends to realign the
frequencies of observation by estimating the NKPC allowing for higher-than-
quarterly frequencies. In order to do so, we suitably adjust the frequency-
dependent parameters of the model according to the rules described in Franke
and Sacht (forthcoming). A higher observation frequency not only strongly
mitigates the well known problems of small-sample bias (see, e.g., Fuhrer et
al., 1995; Linde´, 2005) and structural breaks (see, e.g., D’Amato et al., 2007),
but also avoids the overstatement of the true price stickiness, which arises from
employing lower frequency price aggregates (Ellis, 2009; Abe and Tonogi, 2010).
Applying a daily frequency allows us to obtain estimates for the Calvo param-
1. Introduction 7
eter of nominal rigidity over a very short period, for instance, for the recent
financial and economic crisis. These daily estimates can then be easily trans-
formed into their low-frequency equivalences, to be used for the calibration of
macroeconomic models. With Argentine data from the end of 2007 to the be-
ginning of 2011 we estimate the daily Calvo parameter and find that on average
prices remain fixed for approximately two to three months which is exactly in
line with recent microeconomic evidence for Argentina from Cavallo (2012). Our
results have strong implications for the conduct of monetary policy analysis. If
the average frequency of fixed prices is calibrated according to high-frequency
evidence (may it be micro- or macroeconometric) rather than evidence stem-
ming from quarterly data, nominal rigidities are much less pronounced and with
it also the power of monetary policy to influence economic fluctuations. On the
other hand, our results imply that - for the case of Argentina - a quarterly model
would need to be calibrated as a Real Business Cycle (henceforth: RBC) flexible
price model, instead of a New Keynesian sticky price model. In a RBC model,
however, the analysis of monetary policy is redundant. Therefore, in order to
analyze monetary policy in a sticky price framework, the NKM model must be
at most on a monthly frequency.
While the first deviation is concerned with the value of the Calvo parameter,
the second deviation is concerned with the interpretation of the Calvo parame-
ter. In general, economists estimate the slope of the Phillips curve, given that
we interpret the Calvo parameter as deep parameter in the sense that it is con-
stant over the full horizon of the analysis. This assumption clearly falls short
to the Lucas critique, as economic agents have an incentive to change prices
or wages more often in times of high inflation compared to times of low infla-
tion, leading to state-dependent rather than time-dependent pricing behavior.
Therefore, the slope of the short-run NKPC might be non-linear in inflation,
as also proposed by Gertler and Leahy (2008). In Chapter 5 we empirically
investigate the time- and state-dependent behavior of aggregate price setting.
We implement a testing procedure by means of a nonparametric representation
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of the structural form NKPC. By means of the so-called functional coefficient
regression we allow for potential dependence of the Calvo parameter on infla-
tion and inflation uncertainty. Thus, we can test for state-dependence of the
Calvo parameter in a straightforward way. To address residual heteroscedastic-
ity in the inference process regarding functional dependence, we make use of the
factor-based bootstrap. We confirm that the Calvo scheme is a rather restrictive
model of aggregate price setting, since it deploys state-dependence, especially,
with respect to inflation. Quantitatively, the influence of inflation on the Calvo
parameter is small but statistically significant. Further, it is documented that
a number of shortcomings of empirical NKPC representations in explaining in-
flation data may be addressed by means of a state-dependent pricing rule. In
particular, problems of insignificant or even implausibly negative estimates of
the relation between inflation and marginal costs are considerably reduced in
the framework of our more general NKPC specification.
Summarizing the empirical part of the thesis calls for some cautionary notes
on the way we think about nominal rigidities with clear implications for the
analysis in the theoretical part of this thesis. First, with standard macroe-
conometric applications, we tend to overstate the true nominal rigidity in the
economy. Therefore, estimates of structural NKPCs from quarterly data might
not be suitable means to calibrate NKMs for simulation. Relying on traditional
estimates, economists run the risk of overstating the power of monetary policy.
With respect to the NKM from Chapter 2 we present a robustness analysis that
takes account of this fact and allows for varying degrees of nominal rigidity.
As the Chapter shows, the degree of nominal rigidity not only influences the
extend to which monetary policy influences the real sector, but also changes
the optimal inflation target. The overall effects are by no means negligible and
should be suitably accounted for. Chapter 4, in this sense, offers a novel way to
obtain estimates for the Calvo parameter, which seem closer to the true degree
of price stickiness in the economy considered.
Second, thinking about firms price setting in terms of a strict time-dependent
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pricing rule is a much too restrictive assumption. As Chapter 5 shows, price
setting is described by a state-dependent process rather than a time-dependent
one. Inspired by this evidence, state-dependent price and wage setting is given
special attention in this thesis. Additionally to time-dependent pricing a` la
Calvo (1983), Chapter 2 analyzes the influence of inequality aversion on the
long-run effectiveness of monetary policy under state-dependent wage setting,
by means of a standard ad-hoc adjustment cost model. Even though the influ-
ence of inflation on the average frequency of nominal changes in our model is
somewhat small, which is in line with the empirical results for state-dependent
pricing from Chapter 5, this does not mean that time-dependent pricing is a
suitable approximation for state-dependent price and wage setting. Especially
for higher inflation rates, say above 5%, the quantitative difference from the
state-dependent approach to the time-dependent approach increase. Unfortu-
nately, time-dependent price setting mechanisms still dominate the literature on
monetary policy. These time-dependent pricing rules are, like most of the stan-
dard state-dependent pricing rules, derived from ad-hoc assumptions about the
price setting process. Chapter 3, by contrast, offers a novel price setting mecha-
nism, which is derived completely from optimal microeconomic decision making
based on our alternative view on preferences. In accordance with the evidence
found in Chapter 4, prices are far from flexible in this alternative approach and,
in accordance with our finding in Chapter 5, price setting is state-dependent.
Therefore, Chapter 3 suggests a new rationale for the empirical findings on price
sluggishness from Chapters 4 and 5, which are much in line with the empirical
literature on pricing in general.
Finally, the thesis ends with a summary of the most important results and
contributions and gives a brief outlook for future research.
2. INEQUALITY AVERSION AND THE PHILLIPS CURVE
Sections 2.1 - 2.6 are joint efforts with Professor Dennis J. Snower, Ph.D. and
have been published in the paper “Envy, Guilt, and the Phillips Curve” in the
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, volume 99, March 2014, pages
69-84. The journal article is available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.015.
2.7 How Useful is the Calvo Nominal Contracts Scheme?
In this section we discuss the validity of the Calvo nominal contracts scheme for
our analysis. As indicated in Section 2.4, the Calvo nominal contracts scheme
implies an upper bound on the steady state inflation rate, up to which the model
is defined. For this reason, we have so far restricted our analysis to steady state
inflation rates equal to and below 5 percent. As Ascari (2004) and Bakhshi et
al. (2007a) point out, for the optimal reset wage to be defined in the steady
state, all effective discount factors in equations (2.8) and (2.9) must be smaller
than unity for the infinite summations over these effective discount factors to
converge to a finite value. Convergence is granted if the following condition is
satisfied:34
max
{
αβ(1 + pi)2(θ−1);αβ(1 + pi)θ(1+η)
}
< 1. (2.17)
34The condition stated in equation (2.17) can be directly seen from equations (2.46) and (2.47)
in the appendix.
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Fig. 2.7: Admissible parameter space for steady state inflation
From condition (2.17) it follows that the maximum inflation rate p¯i, for which
the model is defined under the Calvo nominal contracts scheme, is given by
p¯i = min

(( 1
αβ
) 1
2(θ−1)
)4
− 1
 100;
(( 1
αβ
) 1
θ(1+η)
)4
− 1
 100
 .
(2.18)
The criterion in (2.18) depends on the parameters α, β, θ, and η. The influence
of β and η is quantitatively negligible over the range of values considered for
these parameters. This is different for α and θ. The larger either the substi-
tutability among the worker types θ or the Calvo probability α, the closer to
unity the effective discount factors, even for low rates of steady state inflation. A
visual representation for admissible steady state inflation rates, given the range
of values for the parameters α and θ from the robustness exercise, is displayed
in Figure 2.7.35 The black shaded surface denotes our threshold of 5 percent
steady state inflation. The light shaded surface and the dark shaded surface are
the first and the second term in equation (2.18), respectively.
The left panel of Figure 2.7 shows that with the exception of very low sub-
stitutability among the different labor types (i.e. a very low value for θ) the first
expression in (2.18) is binding. The right panel of Figure 2.7 shows a magnifi-
35Figure 2.7 stems from the base calibration. All results reported in this section carry through
for alternative values of η ∈ (0.11; 0.25; 0.66) and in the absence of discounting, i.e. β = 1.
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cation of the southern tip of the left panel, i.e. for very sticky wages combined
with highly substitutable labor types. As is apparent, if α > 0.81 and θ > 9.5
hold joint, the maximum steady state inflation rate is slightly below our thresh-
old value of 5 percent.36 This extreme parameter combination, however, has
not been applied in this chapter and therefore, in each application above, our
model under the Calvo nominal contracts scheme is defined, given our choice
for a maximum steady state inflation rate of 5 percent.
The literature provides two straightforward ways to address this technical
constraint. A first solution is to endogenize the frequency of wage adjustment, as
seen in the previous section. The argument goes along the following line: With
higher inflation workers update their wage contracts more frequently, i.e. they
shorten the average contract period. Consequently, while the effective discount
factor increases in steady state inflation, it decreases through a declining Calvo
probability α.37 A second alternative to circumvent the technical constraint is
to apply the nominal contract scheme by Taylor (1979) instead of the nominal
contract scheme by Calvo (1983). Since the Taylor nominal contract scheme
has finite wage contracts, each contract period by definition has a finite present
value. Convergence of infinite sums is no issue in this approach. We explore
this alternative in the next section.
2.8 Taylor Nominal Contracts Scheme
In this section we compare the Calvo nominal contracts scheme to the Taylor
nominal contracts scheme. The former is characterized by a random duration
of each single wage contract, whereas in the latter wage contracts are rewritten
in a certain predetermined interval, say each year, in a uniformly staggered
manner. This comparison is of interest, since much of the literature on the
long-run New Keynesian Philips curve resorts to the Taylor nominal contracts
36In the absence of discounting (β = 1) the joint threshold is given by α > 0.8 and θ > 9.1.
37The relative quantitative importance of each of the two effects on the effective discount factor
depends on the inflation elasticity of the Calvo probability.
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scheme.38 Additionally, the Taylor nominal contracts scheme is not subject
to the technical constraint from the previous section. For this reason, we are
able to explore the Phillips curves for steady state inflation rates higher than
5 percent. In the following we briefly lay out the model under Taylor nominal
wage contracts and juxtapose the long-run Phillips curves associated with each
of the two wage setting regimes.
2.8.1 Workers with Taylor nominal Wage Contracts
Under the Taylor (1979) nominal contracts scheme workers are grouped into N
different wage setting cohorts h, for h = 1...N and N < ∞. Each period a
different cohort h writes a new wage contract and each wage contract is fixed
for N periods. Thus, wage contracts are uniformly staggered. The number of
periodsN is chosen such that wage contracts are fixed for one year, in accordance
with empirical macroeconomic evidence by Taylor (1999). The preferences of a
representative worker from cohort h are represented by a (social) utility function
of the form
ut(ch,t, nh,t,∆h,k¯,t) = ch,t − ζ
n1+ηh,t
1 + η
− ψh,k¯,t
∆2
h,k¯,t
2
, (2.19)
where ch is consumption of a worker from cohort h and nh is her labor supply.
The term ∆h,k¯ denotes the relative real income position of a worker from cohort
h, which is defined as
∆h,k¯,t = wh,tnh,t −
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=h
wk,tnk,t, (2.20)
where wh,t is the period-t value of the nominal contract wage of a worker from
cohort h. Inequality aversion, again, is captured by the third term in the utility
function. Workers who fall short of the average real income from all other
cohorts feel envy, while workers who exceed it feel guilt. Worker h′s period-i
38See, e.g. Ascari (1998, 2004), Graham and Snower (2003, 2004, 2008, 2013), Karanassou et
al. (2005, 2008), Vaona (2012, 2013a, b), and Vaona and Snower (2008).
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budget constraint is given by
ch,t +mh,t+1 + bh,t+1 = wh,tnh,t +
Rtbh,t +mh,t
1 + pi
+ Υh,t, (2.21)
with mh and bh being real money and bond holdings of a worker from cohort h.
Lump sum transfers from the government to workers from cohort h are given
by Υh. Analogously to the model under the Calvo nominal contracts scheme
with group comparison, the indicator function ψh,k¯,t is
ψh,k¯,t =
 ε for ∆h,k¯,t < 0γ for ∆h,k¯,t > 0 . (2.22)
At the beginning of a new contract period, a worker from cohort h sets her reset
wage to maximize her expected utility over the finite contract period
max
wh,t
Et
N−1∑
i=0
βi
[
ut+i(ch,t+i, nh,t+i,∆h,k¯,t+i)
]
, (2.23)
subject to her budget constraint (2.21) and her downward-sloping labor de-
mand curve (2.2). The optimal wage is set as a markup over the marginal rate
of substitution between the present value of the marginal disutilities of labor
(the numerator) and the sum of the present values of the marginal utilities of
consumption and income (the denominator):
w∗h,t = µ
ζEt
∑N−1
i=0 β
in1+ηh,t+i
Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
i nh,t+i
(1+pi)i
− Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
iψh,k¯,t+i∆h,k¯,t+i
nh,t+i
(1+pi)i
, (2.24)
which after some simple rearrangements yields the labor supply relation
µζEt
N−1∑
i=0
βin1+ηh,t+i = Et
N−1∑
i=0
βi
(
1− ψh,k¯,t+i∆h,k¯,t+i
) w∗h,tnh,t+i
(1 + pi)
i
. (2.25)
Since wage contracts are finite, deterministic and fully symmetric under the
Taylor nominal contracts scheme the steady state reset wage index differs from
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Fig. 2.8: Relation of inflation to real variables under the Taylor nominal contracts
scheme
the steady state wage index under the Calvo nominal contracts scheme. Under
the Taylor nominal contracts scheme it is given by
wTaylor =
[
1
N
1− (1 + pi)N(θ−1)
1− (1 + pi)θ−1
] 1
θ−1
. (2.26)
The model under the Taylor nominal contract scheme is fully described by the
reset wage (2.26), the labor demand relation (2.2), and the labor supply relation
(2.25). Following Taylor (1999), we calibrate N = 4 to match wage contracts
which are fixed for one year in a quarterly setting.39 All remaining parameters
are calibrated in accordance with Table 2.1. Finally, we solve the model along
the same lines described in Section 2.3.3.
2.8.2 Results
Figure 2.8 shows the long-run Phillips curves associated with the Taylor nominal
contracts scheme for steady state inflation rates up to 20 percent. The upper
two Phillips curves show the long-run tradeoff in the presence of envy and guilt,
while the lower two Phillips curves show the long-run tradeoff in the absence of
39The results are fully robust to the number of cohorts, given that contracts are fixed for one
year.
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envy and guilt. Not surprisingly, the figure shows that also for the model with
the Taylor nominal contracts scheme the positive long-run tradeoff is substantial,
only under the presence of envy and guilt. In the absence of envy and guilt, the
standard result in the literature is restored, i.e. the tradeoff is barely positive for
very small inflation rates and significantly negative afterwards. Under the Taylor
nominal contract scheme, inflation influences macroeconomic activity through
the same four channels (i.e. employment cycling, labor smoothing, discounting,
and envy and guilt) as in the earlier sections. Therefore, the intuitive analysis
for the long-run tradeoff under the Taylor nominal contracts scheme carries over
one-to-one from the model under the Calvo nominal contracts scheme (Section
2.4).
While qualitatively, the Taylor nominal contracts scheme and the Calvo nom-
inal contracts scheme, produce the same outcome, quantitatively, they do not.
A first indication is already given by Figure 2.8. The typical nonlinear shape
of the long-run Phillips curves displayed in the figure arises over a much wider
range of steady state inflation (i.e. up to 20 percent). Figure 2.9 strengthens
this point. The figure juxtaposes the long-run Phillips curves associated with
the Taylor nominal contracts scheme (crossed) and the Calvo nominal contracts
scheme (circled). The figure shows that the sensitivity of the long-run tradeoff
with respect to the steady state inflation rate differs substantially among the
two approaches. While the long-run tradeoff under the Calvo nominal contracts
scheme is highly sensitive to trend inflation, turning negative already at mod-
erate inflation rates around four percent, the Phillips curves under the Taylor
nominal contracts scheme remain positive over the full range of steady state
inflation considered.40
The reason for this result is straightforward. As noted, the long-run tradeoff
is generated by real wage and income dispersion. With Calvo nominal wage
contracts some workers have not reset their nominal wage for a very long time.
Consequently, these workers’ real wages approach zero, which in turn makes
40This result is in line with well established theoretical evidence by Ascari (2004).
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Fig. 2.9: Relation of inflation to real variables under the Calvo nominal contracts
scheme and the Taylor nominal contracts scheme
firms want to employ almost exclusively from this worker pool. The inefficiency
associated with the resulting excessive use of employment cycling substantially
drives down output. Any (even small) positive steady state inflation rate drives
a large wedge between the highest and the lowest real wage, making real macroe-
conomic activity highly sensitive to positive steady state inflation. Under the
Taylor nominal contracts scheme, on the other hand, there are only a few dif-
ferent wages. In the case considered above, there are only four different wage
setting cohorts and therewith only four different wages. Furthermore, none of
these prices is older than one year by definition. Although, also under the Tay-
lor nominal contracts scheme, positive trend inflation drives a wedge into the
real wage distribution, this wedge is substantially smaller. Therefore, under
the Taylor nominal contracts scheme much higher trend inflation is necessary
to generate wage dispersion large enough for the employment cycling and labor
smoothing effects to dominate in a quantitative equivalent manner as under the
Calvo nominal contracts scheme. Consequently, the long-run tradeoff is much
less sensitive to steady state inflation.
Another advantage of the Taylor nominal contracts scheme, is its tractability.
This allows us to analyze an alternative model of inequality aversion, namely
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the bilateral comparison by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which we consider in the
next section.
2.9 Bilateral vs. Group Comparison
Up to this point, following the idea of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), workers
engaged in group comparison, i.e. they have compared their real income to the
average real income of all other workers in their reference group.41 In what
follows, we allow for a different approach to inequality aversion. Following
the idea of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), workers compare their real income to
each other real income in their reference group bilaterally and evaluate the
outcome of each comparison individually. We refer to this approach as “bilateral
comparison.”42
The different treatment of the reference group strongly affects the impli-
cations of inequality aversion for utility. Intuitively, under group comparison
the middle-income worker does not suffer from any inequality aversion at all,
whereas the same worker suffers substantially from both - envy and guilt -
under bilateral comparison. Thus, with group comparison workers exclusively
care about their relative position to the average income, whereas with bilateral
comparison workers care about the income distribution per se.
Against this background, we compare the influence of these two different
concepts of inequality aversion on the effectiveness of monetary policy. For
simplicity and analytical tractability, we resort to the Taylor nominal contracts
scheme from the previous section.
41The reference group was defined as the whole economy.
42The articles by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are the two pre-
dominant contributions in the literature on inequality aversion. Bergh (2008) shows that
by May 2007 the combined citation impact of these two articles relative to other significant
contributions in the field of other-regarding preferences had been approximately 84 percent.
Individually, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) had accounted for 46
percent and 38 percent, respectively.
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2.9.1 Workers with Bilateral Comparison
As in the previous section, monopolistic competitive workers write Taylor wage
contracts. The preferences of the worker are represented by her (social) utility
function
ut(ch,t, nh,t,∆h,k,t) = ch,t − ζ
n1+ηh,t
1 + η
− 1
N − 1
∑
k 6=h
ψh,k,t
∆2h,k,t
2
, (2.27)
where ∆h,k,t denotes the bilateral real income deviation between a worker from
cohort h and a worker from cohort k for k = 1, . . . , N − 1, defined by
∆h,k,t = wh,tnt − wk,tnk,t. (2.28)
Inequality aversion is governed by the third term in the utility function (2.27),
which implies that a worker from cohort h bilaterally compares her real income
to the real income of each other worker k 6= h in her reference group. If a worker
falls short of another worker’s income, she feels envy, whereas she feels guilt,
if she exceeds another worker’s income. For the special case of only two wage
setting cohorts (N = 2), group comparison and bilateral comparison coincide.
With bilateral comparison, the indicator function ψh,k,t is
ψh,k,t =
 ε for ∆h,k,t < 0γ for ∆h,k,t > 0 . (2.29)
At the beginning of a new contract period worker h maximizes her utility func-
tion
max
wh,t
Et
N−1∑
i=0
βiut+i(ch,t+i, nh,t+i,∆h,k,t+i) (2.30)
subject to her budget constraint (2.21) and her individual labor demand curve
(2.2). The optimal wage is again set as a markup over the marginal rate of
substitution between the present value of the disutility of labor and the sum of
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Fig. 2.10: Relation of inflation to real variables for group versus bilateral comparison
the present values of the marginal utility of consumption and income.
w∗h,t = µ
ζEt
∑N−1
i=0 β
in1+ηh,t+i
Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
i nh,t+i
(1+pi)i − Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
inh,t+i
1
N−1
∑
k 6=h ψh,k,t+i∆h,k,t+i
.
(2.31)
Rearranging the optimal reset wage yields the labor supply equation under
bilateral comparison.
µζEt
N−1∑
i=0
βin1+ηh,t+i=Et
N−1∑
i=0
βi
w∗h,tnh,t+i
(1 + pi)i
1− 1
N − 1
∑
k 6=h
ψh,k,t+i∆h,k,t+i
(2.32)
Under bilateral comparison, the model is fully described by the reset wage
(2.26), the labor demand relation (2.2), and the labor supply relation (2.32).
Once again, we solve the model numerically along the lines described in Section
2.3.3.
2.9.2 Results
Figure 2.10 shows the Phillips curves associated with group comparison (cir-
cled) and bilateral comparison (crossed), given the base calibration from Table
2.1 and N = 4. The figure shows that monetary policy has significant long-run
real effects under both models of inequality aversion. Interestingly, while the
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qualitative result is independent of the choice between bilateral and group com-
parison, the quantitative result is not. Figure 2.10 clearly indicates that the
effectiveness of monetary policy is larger, if the underlying workers evaluate in-
come inequality on a bilateral basis. Expansionary monetary policy, for instance
given by an increase in money growth from 0 percent to 2 percent, is associated
with a 0.89 percent increase in aggregate employment under group comparison,
whereas this figure elevates to 1.13 percent under bilateral comparison. Output
increases by 0.88 percent and 1.12 percent, respectively.
This result is not surprising. Under bilateral comparison, steady state infla-
tion generates substantially more envy and guilt than under group comparison.
This can be best illustrated by looking at the middle-income worker. Consider
first the middle-income worker using group comparison. Intuitively, the middle-
income worker has disutility neither from envy nor from guilt, since the worker
earns exactly as much as the average of all other workers. The same worker,
however, has substantial disutility from both, envy and guilt, when she engages
in bilateral comparison. She feels envy towards all workers who exceed her real
income and guilt towards all workers who fall short of her real income. Since
envy is greater than guilt, however, she will increase her average employment
over the contract period. This real effect is not matched by the middle-income
worker under group comparison. A similar weighting effects also hold true for
non-middle-income workers. In general, under group comparison, workers over-
rate positive deviations and underrate the role of negative deviations, giving
rise to more guilt and less envy. Therefore, this weighing-effect mitigates the
dominance of the envy effect over the guilt effect and induces a weakened net
reaction of employment to income inequality.
2.10 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has incorporated inequality aversion into an otherwise standard
New Keynesian DSGE model with staggered, monopolistically competitive nom-
inal wage contracts. In this context, the relation between inflation and macroe-
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conomic activity is generated by four phenomena: employment cycling, labor
supply variability, discounting, and envy-guilt effects. The first two phenomena
imply an inverse relation between inflation and macroeconomic activity, whereas
the last two are complementary and imply a positive relation. Furthermore, the
last two dominate at low inflation rates, whereas the first two dominate at high
inflation rates. Consequently, the Phillips curve is backward-bending, so that in-
creases in money growth lead to higher employment and output at low inflation,
but to lower employment and output at high inflation.
What is striking about this tradeoff is that inequality aversion generates a
positive tradeoff between inflation and macroeconomic activity over a substan-
tial range of low inflation rates. We show that, along this tradeoff, the optimal
inflation rate is significantly positive. For our base calibration, the optimal
inflation rate is just under 2 percent.
This result is consonant with central banking practice. By contrast, the
mainstream literature on optimal monetary policy places the optimal inflation
rate in the range between zero and a negative number (minus the real interest
rate, as implied by the Friedman rule).
Endogenizing the probability of wage adjustment does not restore monetary
long-run neutrality, as long as wage changes are costly.
Furthermore, we have shown that the positive long-run tradeoff is also gen-
erated under the Taylor nominal contracts scheme. Even though the Taylor
nominal contracts scheme seems technically preferable to the Calvo nominal
contracts scheme, the former lacks ability to create a convincing environment
for the presence of envy and guilt. Knowing that one’s income cycles in a deter-
ministic sense over the course of only one year, it is questionable that feelings
of envy and guilt are generated. In this sense, the Calvo model is much more
suited to create an environment in which envy and guilt flourish. Only if work-
ers do not know for how long their income will be higher or lower than their
reference income, feelings such as envy and guilt might occur.
Finally, we have shown that the long-run tradeoff even strengthens if workers
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compare themselves to each other worker bilaterally instead of comparing to
the average of the economy. As we argue, this result is brought about by
an additional margin of inequality aversion. Workers do not only care about
the average income, but about the income distribution per se. Experimental
evidence by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) indicates that agents comply with
the predictions of a preference structure characterized by bilateral comparison
rather than group comparison. From the macroeconomic perspective, however,
group comparison seems more appropriate than bilateral comparison. This is
due to the availability of income information. While it seems impossible to
gather detailed information on the complete income distribution of an economy,
average income data is publicly available. Such information is provided by, e.g.
national statistical agencies. For the special case of Germany information on the
German average income as well as the average income of several occupational
categories in Germany is published annually by popular German newspapers
and magazines. However, this does not weakens the importance of the result
under bilateral comparison. Even if the model takes place only in a well-defined
reference group, e.g. an occupation, a firm, or such alike, the representative
agent framework still generates macroeconomic results along New Keynesian
lines.
2.11 Appendix A
2.11.1 A1. The Long-Run Tradeoff Between Inflation and Aggregate Output
under the Calvo Nominal Contracts Scheme with Group Comparison
The worker maximizes utility
max
wj,t
Et
∞∑
i=0
(αβ)
i [
U
(
cj,t+i
)− V (nj,t+i)− Z(∆j,k¯,t+i)] , (2.33)
subject to her budget constraint (2.6), her downward-sloping labor demand
(2.2), and the definition of income inequality given by (2.4). The reference
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income is given by the average income in the economy. According to utility
function (2.3)
U
(
cj,t+i
)
= cj,t+i, (2.34)
V
(
nj,t+i
)
= ζ
n1+ηj,t
1 + η
, (2.35)
Z
(
∆j,k¯,t+i
)
= ψj,k¯,t
∆2
j,k¯,t
2
. (2.36)
The first order condition of this maximization problem yields
Et
∞∑
i=0
(αβ)
i
[
(1− θ)Uc nj,t+i
(1 + pi)i
+ θVn
nj,t+i
wj,t
− (1− θ)Z∆ nj,t+i
(1 + pi)i
]
= 0,
(2.37)
where Uc, Vn, and Z∆ denote the first derivatives of (2.34), (2.35), and (2.36),
respectively. Re-arranging equation (2.37) we get
Et
∞∑
i=0
(αβ)
i
θVn
nj,t+i
wj,t
(2.38)
= (θ − 1)
[
Et
∞∑
i=0
(αβ)
i Ucnj,t+i
(1 + pi)i
− Et
∞∑
i=0
(αβ)
i Z∆nj,t+i
(1 + pi)i
]
.
Rearranging equation (2.38) with respect to wj,t yields
wj,t =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
i=0 (αβ)
i
Vnnj,t+i
Et
∑∞
i=0 (αβ)
i
Uc
nj,t+i
(1+pi)i − Et
∑∞
i=0 (αβ)
i
Z∆
nj,t+i
(1+pi)i
. (2.39)
The first derivatives of Vn, Uc, and Z∆ are given by
Vn = ζn
η
j,t+i, (2.40)
Uc = 1, (2.41)
Z∆ = ψj,k¯,t+i∆j,k¯,t+i (2.42)
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Plugging equations (2.40), (2.41), and (2.42) into (2.39) gives the optimal reset
wage as in Section 2.3.2
w∗j,t = µ
ζEt
∑∞
i=0 (αβ)
i
n1+ηj,t+i
Et
∑∞
i=0 (αβ)
i nj,t+i
(1+pi)i − Et
∑∞
i=0 (αβ)
i
ψj,k¯,t+i∆j,k¯,t+i
nj,t+i
(1+pi)i
. (2.43)
where µ = θθ−1 denotes the markup. Rearranging equation (2.43) yields an
equivalent expression to the labor supply equation (2.9). Applying the down-
ward sloping labor demand equation (2.2) to equation (2.43), we can write
equation (2.43) in terms of aggregate labor
w
∗(1+θη)
j,t = µ
ζEt
∑∞
i=0
(
αβ (1 + pi)
θ(1+η)
)i
y1+ηt+i
Et
∑∞
i=0
(
αβ(1 + pi)(θ−1)
)i (
1− ψj,k¯,t+i∆j,k¯,t+i
)
yt+i
. (2.44)
Substituting (2.4) for ∆j,k¯,t+i and dropping time indices yields the steady state
expression of (2.44) given by
w
∗(1+θη)
j = µ
φ
χ
, (2.45)
with
φ = yηζE
∞∑
i=0
(
αβ (1 + pi)
θ(1+η)
)i
, (2.46)
χ = E
∞∑
i=0
(
αβ (1 + pi)
(θ−1)
)i1− ψjy
( w∗j,k¯
(1 + pi)
i
)1−θ
− 1
 . (2.47)
Next, to solve the model numerically, we need to let the infinite sums in equa-
tions (2.46) and (2.47) converge. The sum formulation in (2.46) can be written
in terms of the infinite geometric sum according to the rule
∑∞
k=o x
k = 11−x ,
which results in
φ = yηζ
1
1− αβ (1 + pi)θ(1+η)
. (2.48)
For equation (2.47), this is different. Note that the summation in (2.47) includes
periods of envy as well as periods of guilt. While the worker feels envy in periods
2. Inequality Aversion and the Phillips Curve 26
t = 0, . . . , τ −1, she feels guilt in periods t = τ, . . . ,∞. The threshold τ denotes
the switching point of the sign on the left hand side of equation (2.4). Applying
the indicator function (2.5), equation (2.47) reads
χ = E
τ−1∑
i=0
(
αβ (1 + pi)
(θ−1)
)i1− εy
( w∗j
(1 + pi)
i
)1−θ
− 1
 (2.49)
+ E
∞∑
i=τ
(
αβ (1 + pi)
(θ−1)
)i1− γy
( w∗j
(1 + pi)
i
)1−θ
− 1
 .
The sum formulation in (2.49) can be written in terms of (in-)finite geometric
sums. We apply the rules
∑τ−1
k=0 x
k = 1−x
(τ−1)+1
1−x and
∑∞
k=τ x
k = x
τ
1−x . After
some manipulations equation (2.49) becomes
χ =
y−1 +
(
ε+ (γ − ε) (αβ(1 + pi)θ−1)τ)
1− αβ(1 + pi)θ−1 −
(
ε+ (γ − ε) (αβ(1 + pi)2(θ−1))τ)
w
∗(θ−1)
j
(
1− αβ(1 + pi)2(θ−1)) .
(2.50)
Plugging (2.48) and (2.50) back into (2.45) yields
w
∗(1+θη)
j = µ
yη−1ζ
(
1− αβ(1 + pi)θ(1+η))−1
y−1+(ε+(γ−ε)(αβ(1+pi)θ−1)τ )
1−αβ(1+pi)θ−1 −
(ε+(γ−ε)(αβ(1+pi)2(θ−1))τ)
w
∗(θ−1)
j (1−αβ(1+pi)2(θ−1))
. (2.51)
Exploiting the steady state reset wage (2.14), equation (2.51) fully describes
the relationship between output and steady state inflation, which can be solved
for numerically. Therefore, equations (2.14) and (2.51) describe our long-run
Phillips curve tradeoff. Note that for zero steady state inflation, i.e. pi = 0,
it holds that w∗j = 1 and the envy and guilt parts cancel each other out and
vanish. What remains is the standard formulation from a model without envy
and guilt, i.e. 1 = µζyη.
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2.11.2 A2. The Long-Run Tradeoff Between Inflation and Aggregate
Employment under the Calvo Nominal Contracts Scheme with Group
Comparison
To derive the relationship between inflation and aggregate labor, we first com-
bine the equations for aggregate labor (2.12) and individual labor demand (2.2).
This yields
nt = yt
∫ 1
0
w−θj,t dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
st
, (2.52)
where st denotes the wage dispersion term, which can be written as
st = (1− α)w−θj,t + α(1− α)
(
wj,t−1
(1 + pi)−1
)−θ
+ α2(1− α)
(
wj,t−2
(1 + pi)−2
)−θ
+ . . . .
(2.53)
Equation (2.53) can be recursively written as
st = (1− α)w−θj,t + α(1 + pi)θst−1. (2.54)
In the steady state this yields
s =
(1− α)w−θj
1− α(1 + pi)θ . (2.55)
Therefore, the steady state version of (2.52) - including the definition for s
given by (2.55) - and long-run Phillips curve (2.51) yields the long-run tradeoff
between inflation and aggregate labor.
2.11.3 A3. Linear Inequality Aversion
In this section we give proof of the inviability of the original version of Fehr
and Schmidt’s (1999) utility function in our model setup. We show that for
zero inflation, the model does not break down to the standard NKM with trend
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inflation.
Assume a utility function analogous to equation (2.3), only with inequality
aversion entering linearly as suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
ut(cj,t, nj,t,∆j,k¯,t) = cj,t − ζ
n1+ηj,t
1 + η
− ψj,k¯,t∆j,k¯,t (2.56)
Income inequality ∆j,k¯,t is again defined by equation (2.4). Under linear in-
equality aversion ∆j,k¯,t changes signs, depending on the position in the income
distribution, i.e. ∆j,k¯,t < 0 for having a lower than average real income and
∆j,k¯,t > 0 for having a higher than average real income. To make sure that
inequality aversion always enters utility negatively, we calibrate the envy and
guilt parameters according to the following scheme:
ψj,k¯,t =
 −ε for ∆j,k¯,t < 0γ for ∆j,k¯,t > 0 . (2.57)
Everything else equal, a resetting worker again maximizes utility (2.33) subject
to her budget constraint (2.6), her labor demand function (2.2) and the defini-
tion of inequality aversion (2.4). Therefore, the general optimal reset wage is
still given by equation (2.39). Only the partial derivative with respect to income
inequality Z∆ is different in this case. In this case it is simply Z∆ = ψj,k¯,t+i.
Therefore, the reset wage becomes
w∗j,t = µ
ζEt
∑∞
i=0 (αβ)
i
n1+ηj,t+i
Et
∑∞
i=0 (αβ)
i nj,t+i
(1+pi)i − Et
∑∞
i=0 (αβ)
i
ψj,k¯,t+i
nj,t+i
(1+pi)i
. (2.58)
In terms of aggregate labor, in the steady state, this yields
w
∗(1+θη)
j = µ
yηζE
∑∞
i=0
(
αβ (1 + pi)
θ(1+η)
)i
E
∑∞
i=0
(
αβ (1 + pi)
(θ−1)
)i (
1− ψj,k¯
) , (2.59)
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Applying the geometric sum rules, equation (2.59) becomes
w
∗(1+θη)
j = µ
yηζ
(
1− αβ (1 + pi)θ(1+η)
)−1
(
1− ε− (ε− γ)
(
αβ (1 + pi)
(θ−1)
)τ)(
1− αβ (1 + pi)(θ−1)
)−1 .
(2.60)
Unlike equation (2.51), for zero steady state inflation (pi = 0), the envy-guilt
parts do not cancel each other out. Consequently, envy and guilt would have
effects, even in the absence of income inequality.
2.11.4 A4. Steady State Relative Wage for the Calvo Nominal Contracts
Scheme
To calculate the steady state wage index we drop the time indices. The de-
trended wage index in a Calvo world is given by
wt =
[
(1− α)w∗1−θj,t + α
(
wt−1
1 + pi
)1−θ] 11−θ
. (2.61)
In the steady state we drop time indices
w1−θ = (1− α)w∗1−θj + α
(
w
1 + pi
)1−θ
, (2.62)
and group terms.
(
1− α (1 + pi)θ−1
)
w1−θ = (1− α)w∗1−θj . (2.63)
Given w = 1, (2.63) breaks down to the optimal relative steady state wage given
by
w∗j =
(
1− α
1− α (1 + pi)θ−1
) 1
θ−1
. (2.64)
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2.11.5 A5. The Welfare Function
We find the optimal inflation rate by putting the steady state Phillips curve
into the converging utility function of the worker. Discounted expected lifetime
utility of a worker is given by
U =
∞∑
i=0
(αβ)
i
[
cj,t+i − ζ
n1+ηj,t+i
1 + η
− ψj,k¯,t
∆2
j,k¯,t+i
2
]
, (2.65)
which can be separated into three different motives: consumption, labor, and
income inequality.
U=
∞∑
i=0
(αβ)
i
cj,t+i−
∞∑
i=0
ζ (αβ)
i n
1+η
j,t+i
1 + η
−ε
τ−1∑
i=0
(αβ)
i
∆2
j,k¯,t+i
2
−γ
∞∑
i=τ
(αβ)
i
∆2
j,k¯,t+i
2
(2.66)
Plugging in the labor demand function to substitute for labor yields
U =
∞∑
i=0
(αβ)
i
cj,t+i −
∞∑
i=0
ζ (αβ)
i
((
wj,t
(1+pi)i
)−θ
yt+i
)1+η
1 + η
(2.67)
−ε
τ−1∑
i=0
(αβ)
i
∆2
j,k¯,t+i
2
− γ
∞∑
i=τ
(αβ)
i
∆2
j,k¯,t+i
2
.
Applying the definition of inequality ∆j,k¯,t+i, dropping time indices, and re-
writing the finite and infinite sums in terms of finite and infinite geometric
sums, we find
U =
y(pi)
1− αβ −
ζw
−θ(1+η)
j
y(pi)1+η
1+η
1− αβpiθ(1+η) −
y(pi)2
2
[εa(pi) + γb(pi)] , (2.68)
with
a(pi) = (2.69)w2(1−θ)j 1−
(
αβ (1 + pi)
2(θ−1)
)τ
1− αβ (1 + pi)2(θ−1)
− 2w1−θj
1−
(
αβ (1 + pi)
θ−1
)τ
1− αβ (1 + pi)θ−1
+
1− (αβ)τ
1− αβ

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and
b(pi) =
w2(1−θ)j
(
αβ (1 + pi)
2(θ−1)
)τ
1− αβ (1 + pi)2(θ−1)
− 2w1−θj
(
αβ (1 + pi)
θ−1
)τ
1− αβ (1 + pi)θ−1
+
(αβ)
τ
1− αβ
 .
(2.70)
Now we can again plug in y(pi) and find the maximizing inflation rate.
2.11.6 A6. Derivation of Labor Supply Curve under the Taylor Nominal
Contracts Scheme with Group Comparison
The worker maximizes discounted life-time utility
max
wh,t
Et
N−1∑
i=0
βi
[
U
(
ch,t+i
)− V (nh,t+i)− Z(∆h,k¯,t+i)] (2.71)
subject to her budget constraint (2.21), her downward-sloping labor demand
(2.2), and income inequality (2.20), where the latter is measured in deviations
from the average income in the economy. The first order condition of this
maximization problem yields
Et
N−1∑
i=0
βi
[
(1− θ)Uc nh,t+i
(1 + pi)i
+ θVn
nh,t+i
wh,t
− (1− θ)Z∆ nh,t+i
(1 + pi)i
]
= 0. (2.72)
Rearranging equation (2.72) with respect to wj,t yields
wh,t =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
iVnnh,t+i
Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
iUc
nh,t+i
(1+pi)i − Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
iZ∆
nh,t+i
(1+pi)i
. (2.73)
From the utility function (2.19) we obtain the first order conditions Vn, Uc, and
Z∆:
Vn = ζn
η
h,t+i, (2.74)
Uc = 1, (2.75)
Z∆ = ψh,k¯,t+i∆h,k¯,t+i (2.76)
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Plugging equations (2.74), (2.75), and (2.76) into (2.73) gives the optimal reset
wage for the Taylor model.
w∗h,t = µ
ζEt
∑N−1
i=0 β
in1+ηh,t+i
Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
i nh,t+i
(1+pi)i − Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
iψh,k¯,t+i∆h,k¯,t+i
nh,t+i
(1+pi)i
. (2.77)
Rearranging equation (2.77) yields the labor supply equation (2.25)
µζEt
N−1∑
i=0
βin1+ηh,t+i = Et
N−1∑
i=0
βi
(
1− ψh,k¯,t+i∆h,k¯,t+i
) w∗h,tnh,t+i
(1 + pi)i
. (2.78)
2.11.7 A7. Steady State Relative Wage for the Taylor Nominal Contracts
Scheme
The steady state wage index is a weighted average of the single cohorts wages,
i.e.
wt =
[
1
N
N−1∑
h=0
(
w∗h,t
)1−θ] 11−θ
(2.79)
Given the evolution of the real wage over the contract period, this can be written
as
wt =
[
1
N
N−1∑
h=0
(
w∗h,t−i
(1 + pi)i
)1−θ] 11−θ
. (2.80)
which is equivalent to
wt =
[
1
N
((
w∗h,t
)1−θ
+
(
w∗h,t−1
(1 + pi)
)1−θ
+ · · ·+
(
w∗h,t−N−1
(1 + pi)N−1
))] 11−θ
. (2.81)
In the steady state w∗h,t = w
∗
h,t−1 = · · · = w∗h,t−N−1 = w∗h, which yields
w∗h
w
=
[
1
N
(
1 + (1 + pi)θ−1 + · · ·+ (1 + pi)(N−1)(θ−1)
)] 1θ−1
. (2.82)
The part in parentheses can be expressed as the finite geometric sum of the
form
∑n−1
i=0 x
i = 1−x
n
1−x . Furthermore, it holds that w = 1. Therefore, the real
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reset wage under the Taylor nominal contracts scheme is given by
w∗h =
[
1
N
1− (1 + pi)N(θ−1)
1− (1 + pi)θ−1
] 1
θ−1
. (2.83)
2.11.8 A8. Derivation of Labor Supply Curve under the Taylor Nominal
Contracts Scheme with Bilateral Comparison
The worker maximizes her utility function
max
wh,t
Et
N−1∑
i=0
βi
[
U
(
ch,t+i
)− V (nh,t+i)− Z(∆h,k,t+i)] (2.84)
subject to her budget constraint (2.21), her downward-sloping labor demand
curve (2.2), and income inequality (2.28), where the latter is measured in bilat-
eral deviations from each other worker k in the economy. In generalized form,
the first order condition and the optimal reset wage are equal to equations (2.72)
and (2.73), respectively. The difference comes from the partial derivative with
respect to income inequality, given by
Z∆ =
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=h
ψh,k,t+i∆h,k,t+i. (2.85)
Plugging (2.74), (2.75), and (2.85) into the optimal reset wage (2.73) yields
w∗h,t = µ
ζEt
∑N−1
i=0 β
in1+ηh,t+i
Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
i nh,t+i
(1+pi)i − Et
∑N−1
i=0 β
i nh,t+i
(1+pi)i
1
N−1
∑
k 6=h ψh,k,t+i∆h,k,t+i
.
(2.86)
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Rearranging equation (2.86) yields the labor supply equation under bilateral
comparison and Taylor staggering.
µζEt
N−1∑
i=0
βin1+ηh,t+i (2.87)
= Et
N−1∑
i=0
βi
w∗h,tnh,t+i
(1 + pi)i
− Et
N−1∑
i=0
βi
w∗h,tnh,t+i
(1 + pi)i
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=h
ψh,k,t+i∆h,k,t+i
3. LOSS AVERSE CONSUMERS: AN ALTERNATIVE
THEORY OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT
3.1 Outline
Ample empirical evidence indicates that prices and output respond imperfectly
and asymmetrically to positive and negative demand shocks. While firms accom-
modate positive temporary demand shocks by increasing quantity rather than
price, negative temporary demand shocks are more likely to be accommodated
by temporary price cuts (Hall et al., 2000). In the event of a permanent demand
shock, surprisingly, the asymmetry works the other way around. In this case,
prices are generally more responsive to positive shocks than to negative ones,
implying that output is more responsive to negative shocks than to positive ones
(DeLong and Summers, 1988; Cover, 1992; Weise, 1999; among others). Cur-
rent theories of price adjustment (e.g. Taylor, 1979; Rotemberg, 1982; Calvo,
1983; among many others) fail to account for these asymmetric price and output
responses to positive and negative demand shocks. This chapter, by contrast,
offers a theoretical rationale for the observed empirical asymmetries described
above.
In particular, we present a new theory of firms’ price adjustment in response
to consumer loss aversion, as specified in prospect theory (Kahnemann and
Tversky, 1979). The resulting theory of price adjustment is starkly at vari-
ance with past theories. We find that prices are more upward sluggish than
downward in response to temporary demand shocks (implying that output is
more responsive to negative temporary shocks than positive ones), while they
are more downward sluggish than upward in response to permanent demand
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shocks (implying that output is less responsive to negative permanent shocks
than positive ones).
The basic idea underlying our theory is simple. Price increases are associated
with utility losses for consumers, whereas price decreases are associated with
utility gains. In the spirit of prospect theory, losses are weighted more heavily
than gains of equal magnitude. Consequently, demand responses are more elastic
to price increases than to price decreases. The result is a kinked demand curve1,
for which the kink depends on the consumers’ reference price. In the spirit of
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that the reference price is the consumers’
rational price expectations.
We assume that consumers know whether any given product demand shock
is temporary or permanent. Permanent shocks induce changes in consumers’
rational price expectations and thereby on their reference price, while tempo-
rary shocks do not. Given the shock is temporary, since the demand curve is
kinked, small demand shocks do not affect the firm’s price. This is the case
of price rigidity. For larger shifts, the firm’s price will respond temporarily,
but the size of the response will be asymmetric for positive and negative shifts
of equal magnitude. Since negative shocks move the firm along the relatively
steep portion of the demand curve, prices decline stronger to negative shocks
than they increase to positive ones. In turn, this implies that quantities are less
responsive to negative shocks than to positive ones. Given the demand shock
is permanent, the firm can foresee not only the change in demand following the
immediate pricing decision, but also the resulting change in the consumers’ ref-
erence price. A rise in the reference price raises the firms’ long-run profits (since
the reference price is located at the kink in the demand curve), whereas a fall
in the reference price lowers long-run profits. On this account, firms are averse
to initiating permanent price reductions. By implication, prices are more down-
1Modeling price sluggishness by means of a kinked demand curve is of course a well-trodden
path. Sweezy (1939) and Hall and Hitch (1939) modeled price rigidity in an oligopolistic
framework along these lines. In these models, oligopolistic firms do not change their prices
flexibly because of their expected asymmetric competitor’s reactions to their pricing decisions.
A game theoretic foundation of such model is presented by Maskin and Tirole (1988).
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ward sluggish than upward. This in turn implies that output is more responsive
to negative permanent shocks than positive ones.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant lit-
erature. Section 3.3 presents our general model setup and in Section 3.4 we
analytically and numerically analyze the effects of various demand shocks on
prices and quantities. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Relation to the Literature
As noted, ample empirical evidence suggests that prices and output respond
imperfectly and asymmetrically to exogenous shocks of different sign but equal
magnitude. Furthermore, the implied asymmetry depends on the nature of the
shock, i.e. whether it is permanent or temporary.
Given the nature of a demand shock is permanent, for instance, DeLong and
Summers (1988), Cover (1992), Morgan (1993), Weise (1999), Kandil (2002),
and Ravn and Sola (2004) show for the United States that in the context of
monetary policy shocks prices are generally more responsive to positive shocks
than to negative ones, implying that output is more responsive to negative
shocks than to positive ones. Similar empirical evidence is provided by Karras
(1996) for a variety of European economies, Karras and Stokes (1999) for 12
different OECD countries, and Tan et al. (2010) and Mehrara and Karsalari
(2011) for a variety of non-OECD countries. Moreover, Kandil (1998, 1999)
documents this asymmetry for a wide range of developing and developed coun-
tries in response to aggregate demand shocks and Kandil (2001, 2002) provides
empirical evidence for the asymmetric output reaction to government spending
shocks in the United States.
Looking particularly at temporary demand shocks, Hall et al. (2000) find
that firms respond to temporary increases in demand adjusting quantity rather
than price. Furthermore, firms state that a fall in demand is more likely to lead
to a price cut than a rise in demand is to lead to a price increase. Additional
evidence is provided by Kehoe and Midrigan (2008), who analyze temporary
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price movements. They find that - on average - temporary price cuts are larger
(by a factor of almost two) than temporary price increases. Final support for
our result can be found in the literature on “sales,” which shows that there
are few and only minor temporary price increases, while there are many and
significant price decreases (Eichenbaum et al., 2011). Stronger downward price
reactions, on the other hand, imply weaker quantity reactions.
Despite this evidence, asymmetric reactions to demand shocks have remained
mainly unexplored by current theories of price adjustment. Neither the current
time-dependent pricing models (Taylor, 1979; Calvo, 1983), nor the current
state-dependent adjustment cost models of (S, s) type (e.g., Sheshinski and
Weiss, 1977; Rotemberg, 1982; Caplin and Spulber, 1987; Caballero and En-
gel, 1993, 2007; Golosov and Lucas, 2007; Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Dotsey et
al., 2009; Midrigan, 2011) are able to account for these asymmetry properties in
price dynamics in response to positive and negative exogenous shifts in demand.
In this chapter we offer a new theory of firm price setting resting on consumer
loss aversion in an otherwise standard model of monopolistic competition. The
resulting theory provides a novel rationale for the above described asymmetric
price sluggishness. Even tough (to our knowledge) there is no hard evidence
for a direct link from consumer loss aversion to price sluggishness, yet, there is
ample evidence that firms do not adjust their prices flexibly in order to avoid
harming their customer relationships (see, in particular, Fabiani et al. (2006)
for a survey of euro area countries, Hall et al. (2000) for the United Kingdom,
and Blinder et al. (1998) for the United States).2
Furthermore, there is extensive empirical evidence that customers are indeed
loss averse in prices. Kalwani et al. (1990), Mayhew and Winer (1992), Krish-
namurthi et al. (1992), Putler (1992), Hardie et al. (1993), Kalyanaram and
2Further evidence for OECD countries is provided by, for example, Fabiani et al. (2004) for
Italy, Loupias and Ricart (2004) for France, Zbaracki et al. (2004) for the United States,
A´lvarez and Hernando (2005) for Spain, Amirault et al. (2005) for Canada, Aucremanne
and Druant (2005) for Belgium, Stahl (2005) for Germany, Lu¨nnemann and Matha¨ (2006) for
Luxembourg, Langbraaten et al. (2008) for Norway, Hoeberichts and Stokman (2010) for the
Netherlands, Kwapil et al. (2010) for Austria, Martins (2010) for Portugal, O´lafsson et al.
(2011) for Iceland, and Greenslade and Parker (2012) for the United Kingdom.
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Little (1994), Raman and Bass (2002), Dossche et al. (2010), and many others
find evidence for consumer loss aversion with respect to many different product
categories available in supermarkets. Furthermore, loss aversion in prices is also
well documented in diverse activities such as restaurant visits (Morgan, 2008),
vacation trips (Nicolau, 2008), real estate trade (Genesove and Mayer, 2001),
phone calls (Bidwell et al., 1995), and energy use (Griffin and Schulman, 2005;
Adeyemi and Hunt, 2007; Ryan and Plourde, 2007).
In our model, loss-averse consumers evaluate prices relative to a certain ref-
erence price. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) and Heidhues and Ko˝szegi
(2005, 2008, forthcoming) argue that reference points are determined by agents’
rational expectations about outcomes from the recent past. There is much em-
pirical evidence suggesting that reference points are determined by expectations,
in concrete situations such as in police performance after final offer arbitration
(Mas, 2006), in the United States TV show “Deal or no Deal” (Post et al.,
2008), with respect to domestic violence (Card and Dahl, 2011), in cab drivers’
labor supply decisions (Crawford and Meng, 2011), or in the effort choices of
professional golf players (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011). In the context of labo-
ratory experiments, Knetsch and Wong (2009) and Marzilli Ericson and Fuster
(2011) find supporting evidence from exchange experiments and Abeler et al.
(2011) do so through an effort provision experiment. Endogenizing consumers’
reference prices in this way allows our model to captures that current price
changes influence the consumers’ future reference price and thereby affect the
demand functions via what we call the “reference-price updating effect.” This
effect rests on the observation that firms tend to increase the demand for their
product by raising their consumers’ reference price through, for example, setting
a “suggested retail price” that is higher than the price actually charged (Thaler,
1985; Putler, 1992). These pieces of evidence are consonant with the assump-
tions underlying our analysis. Our analysis works out the implications of these
assumptions for state-dependent price sluggishness in the form of asymmetric
price adjustment.
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There are only a few other theoretical studies that study the implications of
consumer loss aversion on firms’ pricing decisions. Sibly (2002, 2007) analyzes
how the pricing decision of a monopolist is affected by loss averse consumers,
but in his model the consumers’ reference price is exogenously given and he
neither distinguishes between the different kinds of shocks nor formally derives
his results. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) analyze monopolistic pricing decisions
to cost shocks under the assumption that the reference price is determined as
a consumer’s recent rational expectations personal equilibrium in the spirit of
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). Spiegler (2012) repeats the Heidhues and Ko˝szegi
(2008) exercise and shows that incentives for price rigidity are even stronger for
demand shocks compared to cost shocks. Common to all of the above mentioned
studies is a static framework. By contrast, we consider a dynamic approach to
the pricing decision of a monopolistic competitive firm facing loss averse con-
sumers with endogenous reference price formation. Our dynamic approach not
only confirms earlier findings that consumer loss aversion engenders price rigid-
ity, but also allows us to study the asymmetry characteristics of prices reactions
to temporary and permanent demand shocks of different sign. The study clos-
est to ours is probably Popescu and Wu (2007); although they analyze optimal
pricing strategies in repeated market interactions with loss averse consumers
and endogenous reference prices, they do not analyze the model’s reaction to
demand shocks, as in this chapter.
Finally, this chapter offers a new rationale for state-dependent pricing, de-
rived completely from microfoundations. The importance of state-dependence
for firms’ pricing decisions is well documented. For instance, in the countries of
the euro area (Fabiani et al., 2006; Nicolitsas, 2013), Scandianvia (Apel et al.,
2005; Langbraaten et al., 2008; O´lafsson et al., 2011), the United States (Blin-
der et al., 1998), and Turkey (S¸ahino¨z and Sarac¸og˘lu, 2008), approximately two
third of the firms’ pricing decisions are indeed driven by the current state of
the environment. Only in the United Kingdom (Hall et al., 2000) and Canada
(Amirault et al., 2004) state-dependence seems to be somewhat less important
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for firms’ pricing decision. Adjustment or menu costs, giving rise to most of
the current state-dependent pricing models, are clearly rejected as a significant
driver for deferred price adjustments in each of the empirical studies above.
3.3 Model
We incorporate reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion into an other-
wise standard model of monopolistic competition. Consumers are price takers
and loss averse with respect to prices. Prices are evaluated relative to the
consumers’ reference prices, which depend on their rational price expectations.
Prices higher than the reference price are associated with utility losses, while
prices lower than the reference price are associated with utility gains. Losses
are weighted more heavily than gains of equal magnitude. Firms are monopolis-
tic competitors, supplying non-durable differentiated goods. Firms can change
their prices freely in each period to maximize their profits.
3.3.1 Consumers
The representative consumer’s period-utility Ut depends positively on the con-
sumption of n imperfectly substitutable nondurable goods qi,t with i ∈ (1, . . . , n)
and negatively on the ratio of the price pi,t of good i to the consumer’s respec-
tive reference price ri,t of the good. The consumer’s preferences in period t are
represented by the following utility function:
Ut (q1,t, ..., qn,t) =
[
n∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1ρ
, (3.1)
where 0 < ρ < 1 denotes the degree of substitutability between the different
goods. The parameter µ is an indicator function of the form
µ =
 Γ for pi,t < ri,t, i.e. gain domain∆ for pi,t > ri,t, i.e. loss domain , (3.2)
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which describes the degree of the consumer’s loss aversion. For loss averse
consumers, ∆ > Γ, i.e. the utility losses from price increases are larger than the
utility gains from price decreases of equal magnitude. The consumer’s reference
price ri,t is formed at the beginning of each period. In the spirit of Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006), we assume that the consumer’s reference price depends on
her rational price expectation. Shocks materialize unexpectedly in the course
of the period and therefore do not enter the information set available to the
consumer at the beginning of the period. We assume that consumers know,
with a one-period lag, whether a shock is temporary or permanent. While
temporary shocks do not provoke a change in the consumer’s reference price,
the reference price changes in the period after the occurrence of a permanent
shock. Thus the consumer’s reference price is given by ri,t = Et−1 [pi,t]. The
consumer’s budget constraint is given by
n∑
i=1
pi,tqi,t = It, (3.3)
where It denotes the consumer’s income in period t which is assumed to be
constant. For simplicity, we abstract from saving. This implies that consumers
are completely myopic.3 In each period the consumer maximizes her period-
utility function (3.1) with respect to her budget constraint (3.3). The result is
the consumer’s period t demand for the differentiated good i which is given by
qi,t(pi,t, ri,t, µ) = p˜t
η−1
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1)
It
pηi,t
, (3.4)
where η = 11−ρ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the different prod-
uct varieties. The aggregate price index p˜t is given by
p˜t =
 n∑
i=1
(
pi,t
/(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ)1−η 11−η . (3.5)
3Evidence to support this assumption is provided by Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) who
show that many purchase decisions take place in economic environments which are character-
ized by myopic consumers.
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A large number of firms n is assumed, so that the pricing decision of a single
firm does not affect the aggregate price index p˜t. Defining λ = η (1 + µ) − µ,
we can simplify equation (3.4) to
qi,t(pi,t, ri,t, λ) = r
(λ−η)
i,t p
−λ
i,t p˜t
η−1It, (3.6)
where the parameter λ denotes the price elasticity of demand, which depends on
µ and therefore takes different values for losses and gains. To simplify notation,
we define
λ =
 γ for pi,t < ri,tδ for pi,t > ri,t , (3.7)
with δ = η (1 + ∆) − ∆ > γ = η (1 + Γ) − Γ. Equation (3.6) indicates that
the consumer’s demand function for good i is kinked at the reference price ri,t.
The kink, lying at the intersection of the two demand curves qi,t(pi,t, ri,t, γ) and
qi,t(pi,t, ri,t, δ), is given by the price-quantity combination
(p̂i,t, q̂i,t) =
(
ri,t, r
−η
i,t p˜t
η−1It
)
, (3.8)
where “̂” denotes the value of a variable at the kink. Changes in the reference
price ri,t give rise to a change of the position of the kink and also shift the
demand curve as a whole. The direction of this shift depends on the sign of
the difference λ − η. We restrict our analysis to λ ≥ η, i.e. we assume that
an increase in the reference price shifts the demand curve outwards and vice
versa.4
Needless to say, abstracting from reference-dependence and loss aversion
in the consumer’s preferences represented by utility function (3.1), restores the
standard textbook consumer’s demand function for a differentiated good i, given
4The positive relationship between reference price and demand has become a common feature
in the marketing sciences (e.g., Thaler, 1985; Putler, 1992; Greenleaf, 1995). It manifests
itself, e.g., through the “suggested retail price,” by which raising the consumers’ reference
price causes increases in demad (Thaler, 1985). Furthermore, Putler (1992) provides evidence
that an extensive use of promotional pricing in the late 80’s had lead to an erosion in demand
by lowering consumers’ reference prices.
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by
qi,t(pi,t) = p
−η
i,t p˜t
η−1It. (3.9)
We use the standard model as benchmark case, against which we compare the
pricing decisions of a monopolistic competitive firm facing loss averse consumers.
3.3.2 Monopolistic Firms
All firms are identical, enabling us to drop the subscript i. In what follows we
assume that the firm’s total costs are given by Ct(qt) =
c
2q
2
t with c being a
constant, implying that marginal costs are linear in output: MCt(qt) = cqt. In
the presence of loss aversion (δ > γ), the downward-sloping demand curve has
a concave kink at the current reference price: p̂t = rt. Thus the firm’s marginal
revenue curve is discontinuous at the kink:
MRt (qt, rt, λ) =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
qt
r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1It
)− 1λ
, (3.10)
with λ = γ for gain domain and λ = δ for the loss domain, respectively. The in-
terval [MRt (q̂t, rt, γ) , MRt (q̂t, rt, δ)], where MRt (q̂t, rt, γ) < MRt (q̂t, rt, δ),
we call “marginal revenue gap” MRGt(q̂t, rt, γ, δ). We assume that in the initial
steady state, the exogenously given reference price is rss. Furthermore, in the
steady state the firm’s marginal cost curve intersects the marginal revenue gap,
as depicted in Figure 3.1.
This implies that the firm’s optimal price in the initial steady state p∗ss is
equal to rss. The proof is straightforward: Let ν be an arbitrarily small number.
Then for prices equal to rss + ν the firm faces a situation in which marginal
revenue is higher than marginal costs and decreasing the price would raise the
firm’s profit, while for prices equal to rss− ν the firm faces a situation in which
marginal revenue is lower than marginal costs and increasing the price would
raise the firm’s profit. Thus p∗ss = rss has to be the profit maximizing price in
the initial steady state.
In the following analysis we distinguish between two types of firms facing
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Fig. 3.1: Initial steady state
loss averse consumers: the myopic firm and the forward-looking firm. While the
former simply seeks to maximize its current period profit, the latter optimizes
intertemporally. We compare the pricing behavior of these two firms to our
benchmark case which we refer to as the standard firm.
3.4 Demand Shocks
We assume that the government can affect the demand for each product i,
either temporarily or permanently. These demand shocks, represented by εt,
are unexpected and enter the demand function multiplicatively:
qt(pt, rt, λ, εt) = r
(λ−η)
t p
−λ
t p˜t
η−1Itεt. (3.11)
The corresponding marginal revenue functions of the firm are
MRt (qt, rt, λ, εt) =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
qt
r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1Itεt
)− 1λ
. (3.12)
We consider the effects of a demand shock that hits the economy in period
t = 0. To fix ideas, we assume that initially the marginal cost curve crosses the
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midpoint of the discontinuity in the marginal revenue curve.5 This assumption
permits us to derive the symmetry characteristics of responses to positive and
negative demand shocks. The demand shock shifts the marginal revenue curve,
along with the marginal revenue gap MRGt (q̂t, rt, γ, δ, εt). Naturally, for a
sufficiently small shock, the marginal cost curve still intersects the marginal
revenue curve at the discontinuity in the latter, but for a sufficiently large shock,
this is not the case. The maximum size of a small shock for the demand function
(3.11) is
εt (λ) =
(
1− 1
λ
)
r1+ηt
cp˜t
η−1It
, (3.13)
i.e. εt (λ) is the shock size for which the marginal cost curve lies exactly on
the boundaries of the shifted marginal revenue gap MRGt (q̂t, rt, γ, δ, εt (λ)).
6
We consider small and large demand shocks separately and distinguish between
temporary and permanent demand shocks.
3.4.1 Myopic Firm
We start our analysis with the simple case of the myopic firm. This approach
proofs useful, as the results are straightforward to interpret and relevant to our
later examination of the more realistic case of a forward-looking firm. The my-
opic firm simply cares about maximizing its current period profit. The model
therefore collapses to a one-period model and we do not need to distinguish
between temporary and permanent shocks for the analysis of the myopic firm’s
behavior.7
Proposition 1: For myopic firms, small demand shocks are translated one-to-
one into changes in quantities transacted, while prices remain rigid.
5To satisfy this condition, the slope parameter c of the marginal cost curve has to take the
value c = 1
2qss
[MRt (qss, rss, γ) +MRt (qss, rss, δ)]
6For ε (δ), the marginal cost curve intersects the marginal revenue gap on the upper bound,
whereas for ε (γ) it intersects it on the lower bound.
7Obviously, this distinction can be omitted for the standard firm in the one-period model as
well.
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As noted, for a small demand shock εs0 ≤ ε0 (λ) the marginal cost curve still
intersects the marginal revenue gap, i.e. MC0 (q̂0) ∈ MRG0 (q̂0, rss, γ, δ, εs0).
Therefore, the prevailing steady state price remains the myopic firm’s profit-
maximizing price,8 i.e. p∗0 = p
∗
ss, and we have complete price rigidity. Conse-
quently, the shock elasticity of price for small demand shocks ηp,εs is zero. By
contrast, the profit-maximizing quantity changes in response to a small demand
shock. The new profit-maximizing quantity is q∗0 = r
−η
ss p˜0
η−1I0εs0 while the
change of quantity is given by
∆q∗0 =
q∗0
q∗ss
=
εs0
εss
= εs0 6= 1. (3.14)
The shock elasticity of demand for small shocks ηq,εs is unity. Both holds true
irrespective of the sign of the small demand shock.
The result of full price rigidity for small demand shocks is in clear contrast to
the behavior of the standard firm since demand shocks always induce quantity
and price adjustments in that case.9
Proposition 2: For myopic firms, large demand shocks are translated less than
one-to-one into quantities transacted, while prices are sluggish (i.e. they re-
spond, but not fully, to the demand shocks).
For a large shock, i.e. εl0 > ε0 (λ), the marginal cost curve intersects the
marginal revenue curve outside the discontinuity of the latter. Consequently
both, a price and a quantity reaction are induced. The new profit-maximizing
quantity of the myopic firm is
q∗0 =
(
1
c
(
1− 1
λ
)) λ
λ+1 (
r(λ−η)ss p˜0
η−1I0εl0
) 1
λ+1
, (3.15)
8Compare the proof from Section 3.3.2.
9It can be easily shown that the shock elasticities of price and demand for the standard firm
are η˜ε,p, η˜ε,q ∈ (0, 1).
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and its corresponding profit-maximizing price is
p∗0 =
(
r
(λ−η)
ss p˜0
η−1I0εl0
q∗0
) 1
λ
. (3.16)
In comparison to the standard firm the price reaction of the myopic firm to a
large demand shock is smaller, whereas the quantity reaction is larger. For large
demand shocks we therefore find that loss aversion induces price sluggishness
for the myopic firm. The intuition is obvious once we decompose the demand
shock into the maximum small shock and the remainder:
εlarge0 = ε0 (λ) + ε
rem
0 . (3.17)
From our theoretical analysis above we know that the maximum small shock
ε0 (λ) has no price effects, but feeds one-to-one into demand for the myopic firm
but not for the standard firm. By contrast, the remaining shock εrem0 induces
a price and quantity reaction for both. Yet, the price reaction of the myopic
firm induced by εrem0 is smaller. The reason is that the degree, to which the
adjustment takes place, depends negatively on the price elasticity of demand
in the respective firm’s demand function. According to demand functions (3.6)
and (3.9), the price elasticities of demand are λ for the myopic firm and η for
the standard firm. Since by definition λ > η, the price reaction of the myopic
firm must be smaller than that of the standard firm. Hence, for the myopic firm
the overall effect is clearly less pronounced for prices, which implies a larger
output reaction.
Proposition 3: For myopic firms facing small shocks, quantities respond sym-
metrically to negative and positive demand shocks. For those facing large shocks,
prices are more responsive to negative demand shocks than to positive ones
(implying that quantities are less responsive to negative shocks than to posi-
tive ones).
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To see this, the decomposition (3.17) again proves useful. As we have seen,
the maximum small shock ε0 (λ) has symmetric effects for the myopic firm: no
price effect and symmetric quantity effects. This holds true irrespective of the
sign of the shock. However, the remainder εrem0 has asymmetric effects, for the
simple reason that large positive demand shocks move the myopic firm along
the relatively flat portion of the demand curve, whereas large negative demand
shocks move it along the relatively steep portion of the demand curve. The reac-
tion of the optimal price and quantity of the myopic firm in response to a large
positive shock is therefore smaller than the reaction to a large negative shock.
This asymmetry in the reaction to positive and negative large demand shocks
is a distinct feature of consumer loss aversion and stands clearly in contrast to
the case of the standard monopolist where no such asymmetry is found.
3.4.2 Forward-Looking Firm
The forward-looking firm seeks to maximize the discounted stream of current
and future profits. The one-period-lagged updating of the consumers’ reference
price induced by permanent demand shocks therefore influences the forward-
looking firm’s immediate pricing decision in the shock period. In order to cap-
ture this we extend the model of the previous section to two periods.10
Proposition 4: For the temporary shock, forward-looking firms exhibit the same
price-quantity reactions as myopic firms.
Since there is no updating of the consumers’ reference price in the case of
temporary demand shocks, the behavior of the forward-looking firm in the shock
period is identical to that of the myopic firm and needs not to be repeated.
Instead we focus on permanent demand shocks. If the forward-looking firm
changes its price in the shock period t = 0 in response to a permanent demand
10The two-period problem approximates the case in which the firm is non-myopic, but a hyper-
bolic discounter.
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shock to p∗0, consumers update their reference price in the following period
t = 1, i.e. r1 = E0[p1] = p
∗
0. Therefore, price increases in response to perma-
nent positive demand shocks lead to increases in the consumers’ reference price.
Consequently, the demand curve shifts and the kink rises to
(p̂1, q̂1) =
(
r1, r
−η
1 p˜1
η−1I1ε1
)
. (3.18)
Analogously, for price decreases in response to permanent negative demand
shocks the reference price falls and the kink drops. The forward-looking firm
can anticipate this. Thus, it may have an incentive to set its price above the
optimal myopic price (p′0 > p
∗
0) to prevent the reference price from adjusting
downwards and thereby avoid the further reduction in demand for its product
in the following period (at least to some extend). We term this phenomenon
the “reference-price updating effect.”11
Whether or not the forward-looking firm exploits the reference-price updat-
ing effect depends on the outcome of the following tradeoff: On the one hand,
increasing the price above the current period profit-maximizing price12 lowers
the firm’s current period profit suboptimally. On the other hand, the right-
ward shift of the kinked demand curve resulting from updating the consumers’
reference price in the next period increases demand in that period and hence
profits. To analyze which effect dominates, we calibrate the model and solve it
numerically.
3.4.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model for a quarterly frequency in accordance with standard
values in the literature. We assume an annual interest rate of 4 percent, which
yields a discount factor β = 0.99. We follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007b)
and set the monopolistic markup to 25 percent, i.e. η = 5, which is also close
11Needless to say, lowering the price with the aim to decrease the reference price permanently
is not a preferable option for the forward-looking firm. The resulting drop of the reference
price crowds out future demand and therewith profits.
12This is just the optimal price chosen by the myopic firm.
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Parameter Symbol Value
Discount rate β 0.99
Elasticity of subsitution η 5
implying substitutability ρ 0.8
Price elasticity (gain domain) γ 6
Price elasticity (loss domain) δ 12
Loss aversion κ 2
Exogenous income I 1
Exogenous price index p˜t 1
Tab. 3.1: Base calibration
to the value supported by Erceg et al. (2000) and which implies that goods are
only little substitutable, i.e. ρ = 0.8. Since we impose λ ≥ η, we set γ = 6 in our
base calibration. Loss aversion is measured by the relative slopes of the demand
curves in the gain and loss domain, i.e. κ = δγ . The empirical literature on
loss aversion in prices finds that losses induce demand reactions approximately
twice as large as gains (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1991; Putler, 1992; Hardie et
al., 1993; Griffin and Schulman, 2005; Adeyemi and Hunt, 2007). Therefore, we
set κ = 2. The exogenous variables income I and price index p˜t are normalized
to unity.13 The base calibration is summarized in Table 3.1.
3.4.4 Numerical Simulation
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the numerical results of our base calibration for
positive and negative demand shocks in the two-period model. In the tables we
report the shock-arc-elasticities of price
(
η˜ε,p =
%∆p
%∆ε
)
and output
(
η˜ε,q =
%∆q
%∆ε
)
in the period of the shock t = 0 for the myopic firm, the forward-looking firm,
and the standard firm. We focus on permanent demand shocks since we are
interested in the influence of the reference-price updating effect on the immediate
price and output reaction of the forward-looking firm.14
The results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 confirm the theoretical analysis above for
13All results are completely robust to variations of these numerical values.
14Note that in the two-period model there is no difference in the immediate price and output
reaction of the myopic firm with respect to temporary and permanent demand shocks. The
reason is that the myopic firm simply ignores future periods for its current period decision.
The same holds true for the standard firm, since the problem of the intertemporally optimizing
standard firm is completely time-separable.
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myopic firm forward-looking firm standard firm
ηε,p ηε,q ηε,p ηε,q η˜ε,p η˜ε,q
εs0 = 1.01 0 1 0.0100 0.8789 0.1660 0.1660
εs0 = 1.03 0 1 0.0667 0.1866 0.1646 0.1646
εl0 = 1.05 0.0035 0.9560 0.0755 0.0717 0.1633 0.1633
εl0 = 1.07 0.0232 0.7046 0.0790 0.0216 0.1620 0.1620
Tab. 3.2: Shock elasticities of price and output in t = 0 to positive permanent
demand shocks, ε0 (γ) = 1.0476
the myopic firm, summarized in Propositions 1-4. However, not all of these
results carry over to the forward-looking firm in the case of permanent demand
shocks as the following propositions show.
Proposition 5: For forward-looking firms, small and large positive permanent
demand shocks are associated with price sluggishness, but not full price rigidity.
This implies that outputs respond to the shocks, but not one-to-one.
Due to the reference-price updating effect the price adjustment of the forward-
looking firm is generally more pronounced than that of the myopic firm for pos-
itive demand shocks. We find that in response to positive demand shocks the
forward-looking firm increases its price irrespective of the size of the shock (see
Table 3.2). The reference-price updating effect therefore invalidates the result
of full price rigidity for small positive demand shocks found for the myopic firm.
Proposition 6: For forward-looking firms, small negative permanent demand
shocks are associated with price rigidity and large negative permanent demand
shocks are associated with price sluggishness. This implies that outputs respond
more sensitively to negative shocks than to positive ones of equal magnitude.
In contrast to the positive shock, the price response is muted for negative
demand shocks in case of the forward-looking firm. Table 3.3 shows that prices
of the forward-looking firm are fully rigid in response to small negative demand
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myopic firm forward-looking firm standard firm
ηε,p ηε,q ηε,p ηε,q η˜ε,p η˜ε,q
εs0 = 0.99 0 1 0 1 0.1674 0.1674
εs0 = 0.97 0 1 0 1 0.1688 0.1688
εl0 = 0.95 0.0072 0.9592 0.0012 0.9934 0.1702 0.1702
εl0 = 0.93 0.0484 0.7264 0.0013 0.9927 0.1717 0.1717
Tab. 3.3: Shock elasticities of price and output in t = 0 to negative permanent
demand shocks; ε0 (δ) = 0.9524
shocks. For large negative demand shocks the forward-looking firm adjusts its
price but to a considerably lower extend than for large positive shocks of equal
size. Intuitively, by keeping the price (almost) unaltered in response to nega-
tive demand shocks, the forward-looking firm seeks to stabilize the consumers’
reference price. This in turn avoids the negative reference-price updating ef-
fect (i.e. a further permanent reduction in demand), which otherwise would
follow from the price decrease. Therefore, loss aversion offers a rationale for
downward nominal price rigidity. Furthermore, Proposition 6 together with
Propositions 2 and 4 have striking implications for the analysis of price setting
strategies. Since the forward-looking firm avoids price reductions, which lead
to downward-adjustments in the reference price, but conducts price reductions,
which do not influence the reference price, loss aversion offers a simple rationale
for the firm’s practice of “sales.”
Proposition 7: The price reaction of the forward-looking firm is smaller for
negative compared to positive permanent demand shocks, due to the reference-
price updating effect.
Proposition 7 follows directly from our results summarized in Propositions
5 and 6. Due to the reference-price updating effect, the forward-looking firm
always sets its price above the optimal price of the myopic firm, meaning that
the forward-looking firm lowers the price by less in response to a negative shock
and increases the price more in response to a positive shock. Consequently price
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rigidity is considerably more pronounced for negative than for positive demand
shocks. Therefore, the asymmetry of positive and negative shocks reverses,
when moving from temporary to permanent shocks. Intuitively this result is
straightforward: In the face of a large negative shock, a strong price reduction
is favorable only, as long as it does not involve a permanent downward adjust-
ment of the reference price.
Proposition 8: Loss aversion induces price sluggishness irrespective of the sign
and the size of the demand shock and irrespective of whether the model is static
or dynamic.
The results from Tables 3.2 and 3.3 clearly indicate that prices are generally
more sluggish for the forward-looking firm compared to the standard firm for
each case considered. This result, thus, carries over from the myopic firm.
Irrespective of the sign and the size of the demand shock and irrespective of
whether the model is static or dynamic, facing loss averse consumers leads firms
to mute their price responses to demand shocks, relative to firms, which face
standard consumers.
To summarize, propositions 1-8 imply that consumer loss aversion with re-
spect to prices generates price sluggishness in the form of price adjustments
that are asymmetric for positive and negative demand shocks of equal size. The
central prediction of our theory – for permanent shocks, output is more respon-
sive to negative shocks than positive ones, but for temporary shocks, output
is more responsive to positive shocks – may seem surprising at first glance.
However, the underlying intuition is straightforward. As noted, for temporary
shocks, consumers abstract from updating their reference price. Therefore, the
firm does not risk to suffer from a permanent reduction in demand due to a
negative reference-price updating effect, when encountering a drop in demand
with a temporary price reduction. On the other hand, for positive temporary
shocks, the firm cannot generate permanent increases in demand due to upward-
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adjustments of the reference price. Since consumers react more sensitive to price
increases relative to price decreases, the price and quantity reactions are larger
for negative temporary shocks compared to positive ones (Proposition 3). Due
to the presence of the reference-price updating effect, this changes for permanent
shocks. A permanent price reduction (as reaction to a negative shock) initiates
a drop in the consumers’ reference price, decreasing demand even further and
thereby reducing profits. By keeping the price (almost) fixed, the firm avoids
this permanent negative effect. Therefore, the price reaction is almost entirely
muted, giving rise to a large reduction in quantity. The opposite holds true for
a positive permanent shock. The firm can exploit future higher demand by ex-
ploiting the reference-price updating effect. Therefore, the firm raises its price
more than proportionate to the temporary shock price level, reducing quantity
but increasing future expected profits. Both of these asymmetries find much
empirical support in the literature, as indicated in Section 3.2.
3.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In contrast to the standard time-dependent and state-dependent models of price
sluggishness, our theory of price adjustment is able to account for different
price and quantity adjustments to large and small shocks and asymmetric price
and quantity responses to positive and negative shocks of equal magnitude.
Again, in contrast to the standard time-dependent and state-dependent models,
our explanation of price adjustments is derived entirely from microfoundations,
without any recourse to ad hoc assumptions concerning the frequency of price
changes or physical costs of price adjustments.
Future research needs to extend our theory in various ways. Consideration of
heterogeneous firms and multi-product firms will enable this model to generate
asynchronous price changes, as well as the simultaneous occurrence of large
and small price changes, and heterogeneous frequency of price changes across
product. Extending the model to a stochastic environment will generate testable
implications concerning the variability of individual prices.
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3.6 Appendix B
3.6.1 B1. Demand Curve of Loss Averse Consumers
The loss averse consumer maximizes her utility function (3.1) subject to her
budget constraint (3.3). The corresponding Lagrangian problem reads:
max
qi,t
L =
[
n∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1ρ
− ϕ
[
n∑
i=1
pi,tqi,t − It
]
, (3.19)
where ϕ is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first-order condition of the La-
grangian function (3.19) is
∂Lt
∂qi,t
=
1
ρ
[
n∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1ρ−1(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µρ
qρ−1i,t ρ− ϕpi,t = 0. (3.20)
We collect all terms including demand components on the left hand side
qρ−1i,t
[
n∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1−ρρ
= ϕpi,t
(
pi,t
ri,t
)µρ
, (3.21)
and simplify the exponentials
qi,t
[
n∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ]− 1ρ
=
(
ϕpi,t
(
pi,t
ri,t
)µρ) 1ρ−1
. (3.22)
We define overall demand according to a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregate,
which reads
qt =
[
n∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1ρ
. (3.23)
Applying (3.23) as well as the definition of the elasticity of substitution (i.e.
η = 11−ρ ), we can simplify (3.22) to
qi,t = (ϕpi,t)
−η
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1)
qt. (3.24)
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To determine the Lagrangian multiplier ϕ, we plug (3.24) into (3.23)
qt =
 n∑
i=1
((
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ
(ϕpi,t)
−η
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1)
qt
) η−1
η

η
η−1
, (3.25)
which after some simple manipulations yields
ϕ =
 n∑
i=1
(
pi,t
/(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ)1−η 1η−1 ≡ p˜t−1. (3.26)
We define the inverse of the Lagrangian multiplier ϕ as the overall price index
p˜t. Plugging (3.26) back into (3.24) yields
qi,t = p˜t
η
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1)
p−ηi,t qt. (3.27)
Applying the budget constraint (3.3) yields
qi,t = p˜t
η−1
(
pi,t
ri,t
)−µ(η−1)
p−ηi,t It. (3.28)
Finally, we simplify (3.28) using the definition λ = η(1 + µ) − µ, which yields
the demand curve for the differentiated good i
qi,t = r
λ−η
i,t p
−λ
i,t p˜t
η−1It. (3.29)
Including the shock term, equation (3.29) reads
qi,t = r
λ−η
i,t p
−λ
i,t p˜t
η−1Itεt. (3.30)
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3.6.2 B2. Price and Quantity at the Kink
The kink is given by the particular price at which the two demand curves inter-
sect, i.e. qi,t(pi,t, ri,t, γ) = qi,t(pi,t, ri,t, δ). Given (3.30) and λ ∈ (γ, δ), it must
hold that
rγ−ηi,t p
−γ
i,t p˜t
η−1Itεt = r
δ−η
i,t p
−δ
i,t p˜t
η−1Itεt, (3.31)
which simplifies to
rγ−ηi,t p
−γ
i,t = r
δ−η
i,t p
−δ
i,t . (3.32)
Sorting terms yields
pδ−γi,t = r
δ−η−γ+η
i,t . (3.33)
From (3.33) it is obvious that pi,t = ri,t at the kink. Plugging (3.33) back into
(3.30) gives the quantity at the kink
qi,t = r
−η
i,t p˜t
η−1Itεt. (3.34)
3.6.3 B3. Demand Curve of Standard Consumers
The standard consumer (i.e. the non-loss averse consumer) maximizes her utility
function
Ut (q1,t, ..., qn,t) =
[
n∑
i=1
qρi,t
] 1
ρ
, (3.35)
subject to her budget constraint (3.3). The corresponding Lagrangian problem
reads:
max
qi,t
L =
[
n∑
i=1
qρi,t
] 1
ρ
− φ
[
n∑
i=1
pi,tqi,t − It
]
, (3.36)
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where φ is the Lagrangian multiplier for the standard textbook problem. The
first-order condition of the Lagrangian problem (3.36) is
∂Lt
∂qi,t
=
1
ρ
[
n∑
i=1
qρi,t
] 1
ρ−1
qρ−1i,t ρ− φpi,t = 0. (3.37)
We collect all terms including demand components on the left hand side and
simplify the exponentials
qi,t
[
n∑
i=1
qρi,t
]− 1ρ
= (φpi,t)
1
ρ−1 . (3.38)
We define overall demand for the standard consumer by a Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) aggregate of the form
qt =
[
n∑
i=1
qρi,t
] 1
ρ
. (3.39)
Applying (3.39) as well as the definition of the elasticity of substitution, we can
simplify (3.38) to
qi,t = (φpi,t)
−η
qt. (3.40)
To determine the Lagrangian multiplier φ, we plug (3.40) into (3.39)
qt =
[
n∑
i=1
(
(φpi,t)
−η
qt
) η−1
η
] η
η−1
, (3.41)
which after some simple manipulations yields
φ =
[
n∑
i=1
p1−ηi,t
] 1
η−1
≡ p¯t−1. (3.42)
We define the inverse of the Lagrangian multiplier φ as the overall price index
p¯t for the standard textbook problem. Plugging (3.42) back into (3.40) yields
qi,t = p˜t
ηp−ηi,t qt. (3.43)
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Applying the budget constraint (3.3) yields the demand curve for the differen-
tiated good i for the standard consumer
qi,t = p
−η
i,t p˜t
η−1It. (3.44)
Including the shock term, equation (3.44) reads
qi,t = p
−η
i,t p˜t
η−1Itεt. (3.45)
3.6.4 B4. Marginal Revenue Curve
Since all firms are assumed to be identical, we drop the subscript i for the firm
derivations. Revenue is given by
Rt = pt(qt)qt =
(
qt
r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1Itεt
)− 1λ
qt, (3.46)
or in short
Rt =
(
r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1Itεt
) 1
λ
q
1− 1λ
t . (3.47)
The first-order condition with respect to q yields the marginal revenue curve
MRt =
∂Rt
∂qt
=
(
1− 1
λ
)(
qt
r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1Itεt
)− 1λ
. (3.48)
3.6.5 B5. Critical Shock Size
The critical value for the small shock is given by the particular shock ε (λ),
for which the marginal cost curve exactly intersects the critical bounds of the
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shifted marginal revenue gap, i.e.
MC (q∗t )
!
= MR (λ, rt, q
∗
t , εt (λ)) , (3.49)
where MC(qt) =
∂C(qt)
∂qt
= cqt, with C(qt) =
c
2q
2
t . Evaluating the marginal
revenue curve (3.48) and the marginal cost curve at the post-shock optimum
yields
cq∗t =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
q∗t
ε (λ) r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1It
)− 1λ
. (3.50)
From the analysis of small shocks we know that the new quantity of the maxi-
mum small shock is q∗t = εt (λ) r
−η
t p˜t
η−1It. Applying this, we obtain
cεt (λ) r
−η
t p˜t
η−1It =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
εt (λ) r
−η
t p˜t
η−1It
εt (λ) r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1It
)− 1λ
. (3.51)
Solving for εt (λ) yields the critical shock size
εt (λ) =
(
1− 1
λ
)
r1+ηt
cp˜t
η−1It
. (3.52)
3.6.6 B6. Optimal Price and Quantity in Reaction to a Large Shock for the
Myopic Firm
The new optimal price lies at the intersection of the marginal cost curve with
the shifted marginal revenue curve, which by definition is outside the marginal
revenue gap
MC (q∗t , εt) = MR (λ, rt, q
∗
t , εt) . (3.53)
Applying the respective functions yields
cq∗t =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
q∗t
r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1Itεt
)− 1λ
. (3.54)
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Solving this equation for q, we obtain
q∗t =
(
1
c
(
1− 1
λ
)) λ
λ+1 (
r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1Itεt
) 1
λ+1
. (3.55)
The optimal price can be calculated by plugging q∗t into the inverse demand
curve, given by
p∗t =
(
q∗t
r
(λ−η)
t p˜t
η−1Itεt
)− 1λ
. (3.56)
4. ESTIMATING A HIGH-FREQUENCY NEW-KEYNESIAN
PHILLIPS CURVE
The paper “Estimating a high-frequency New-Keynesian Phillips curve,” is joint
work with Dr. Stephen Sacht. This paper has been published in Empirical
Economics, volume 46, issue 2, March 2014, pages 607-628. The journal article
is available at:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-013-0684-7.
5. STATE-DEPENDENCE VS. TIME-DEPENDENCE: AN
EMPIRICAL MULTI-COUNTRY INVESTIGATION OF PRICE
SLUGGISHNESS
5.1 Outline
The effectiveness of monetary policy to impact real variables such as employment
and output crucially depends on the extent to which prices react sluggishly to
central banks’ policy innovations. Therefore, mechanisms of price sluggishness
have become a central aspect of modern DSGE models. In terms of the stan-
dard NKM, price sluggishness strongly influences aggregate inflation dynamics
yielding a non-vertical NKPC in the short run.
The most widely used price-updating mechanism is the Calvo (1983) stag-
gered contracts model, where a constant, randomly selected fraction of firms ad-
just their prices at each time instance in a monopolistically competitive market.
Despite its popularity, this time-dependent specification has been frequently
criticized as being a rather restrictive description of the price setting process
(Caplin and Leahy, 1991; Wolman, 1999). In particular, indicative evidence by
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010) suggests that the Calvo param-
eter should not be regarded as a structural parameter in the sense of a “deep”
and state-invariant coefficient.
The contribution of this chapter is an empirical investigation of the behav-
ior of aggregate price setting. We implement a testing procedure by means of a
nonparametric representation of the structural form NKPC. Such a functional-
coefficient regression model allows to express the Calvo parameter as a functional
coefficient which may be systematically affected by observable factor variables
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such as inflation, inflation uncertainty (IU , henceforth), or both factors simulta-
neously (Danziger, 1983). This specification nests both the typically employed
time- and state-dependent pricing rules. This corresponds to testing for the
null hypothesis of parameter constancy (time-dependent pricing) against the
alternative hypothesis of inflation- or IU -induced price revisions.
For this purpose, we obtain a so-called functional coefficient representation
of the NKPC. This semiparametric model class allows to express functional
dependence of parameters on observable factor variables (Cai et al., 2000). An
important advantage of our approach is that it allows to draw inference on the
state-dependence of the pricing scheme by taking potential heteroscedasticity
of the disturbances into account, which is particularly critical in models which
relate price adjustment to inflation or IU (Sims, 2001). To address residual
heteroscedasticity in the inference process regarding functional dependence, we
make use of the so-called factor-based bootstrap (Herwartz and Xu, 2009).
The distinction between time- and state-dependent pricing schemes is of cru-
cial importance from the policy maker’s point of view. The welfare implications,
measured by minimizing an objective function which is quadratic in inflation
and the output gap (Woodford, 2003), under both schemes generally do not
coincide (Lombardo and Vestin, 2008). Applying the Calvo model to a state-
dependent world, monetary policy runs the risk of putting too little weight on
inflation stabilization.
To summarize the most important findings, we first confirm assertions fre-
quently made in theoretical discussions that the Calvo scheme is a rather re-
strictive model of aggregate price setting. Moreover, it is documented that a
number of shortcomings of empirical NKPC model representations in explaining
inflation data may be addressed by means of a state-dependent pricing rule. In
particular, problems of insignificant or even implausibly negative estimates of
the relation between inflation and marginal costs are considerably reduced in
the framework of our more general NKPC specification. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the relevant literature. Section
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5.3 describes the data set and introduces the model framework. Subsequently,
our approach to estimation and inference is introduced. Section 5.4 summarizes
and discusses the empirical results. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Relation to the Literature
Mechanisms of price sluggishness can be assigned to either time-dependent mod-
els of price setting or state-dependent models of price setting. In time-dependent
price setting models, firms change prices in discrete (Taylor, 1979) or random
(Calvo, 1983) time intervals, independent of the underlying economic environ-
ment. In contrast, state-dependent price setting models assume price adjust-
ments to be somewhat costly1 and therefore price changes depend on observable
fundamental economic factors such as inflation or IU (Fabiani et al., 2006). Al-
though, especially the newer state-dependent models (e.g. Golosov and Lucas,
2007; Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Costain and Narkov, 2011a,b; Dotsey et al.,
2009; Midrigan, 2011) reasonably well resemble a fair amount of the stylized
facts of price setting behavior, time-dependent models - especially the Calvo
(1983) model - are still the most widely adopted price updating schemes in the
literature on monetary policy. The straightforward reason is their analytical
elegance and tractability.
For time-dependent price setting models firms’ price changing decisions are
independent of economic fundamentals - including inflation and IU -, but de-
pends exclusively on time. This is in stark contrast with theoretical and em-
pirical evidence. The theoretical literature suggests inflation to have a positive
influence on the frequency of price adjustment (Sheshinski and Weiss, 19772;
Naish, 1986; Ball et al., 1988; Romer, 1990; Golosov and Lucas, 2007). In the
1These costs can take a variety of different forms, e.g. physical adjustment or “menu” costs
(Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977; Rotemberg, 1982; Mankiw, 1985; Golosov and Lucas, 2007;
Gertler and Leahy, 2008; among many others), information costs (Reis, 2006; Woodford,
2009; Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2009), or consumer costs such as customer disenchantment
(Sibly, 2002, 2007), customer anger (Rotemberg, 2005), and customer regret (Rotemberg,
2010).
2Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) show that in general inflation has an ambiguous effect on the
frequency of price changes. The negative effect of inflation on price changes occurs, however,
only under unreasonably high inflation rates.
5. State-dependence vs. Time-dependence 67
context of DSGE models, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010) find
that movements in the Calvo pricing parameter are negatively correlated with
inflation. Canova (2006) estimates a small-scale NKM for a variety of data sam-
ples for the United States and reports that the Calvo parameter seems to be rel-
atively stable over most subsamples, with some variation for a few subsamples.
Also Cogley and Sbordone (2005) find some weak evidence for variation of the
Calvo parameter over different time periods for a non-zero steady state NKPC
with indexation and strategic complementarities. These theoretical predictions
are strongly supported by empirical evidence of, e.g. Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), and Klenow and Malin (2010) for the
United States and A´lvarez et al. (2006), Dyhne et al. (2006), and Vermeulen
(2012) for the euro area. For IU the picture is less clear cut. While IU might
be used to cover increases in firms’ markup (Van Hoomissen, 1988; Be´nabou,
1992; Tomassi, 1994) and thereby increases the frequency of price adjustments,
it might also induce stronger search effort by customers, which leads to a closer
monitoring of prices and consequently reduces price changes (Be´nabou, 1992;
Be´nabou and Konieczny, 1994). Furthermore, a negative impact of IU on the
frequency of price adjustment is also apparent in the presence of price adjust-
ments costs (Sheshinksi and Weiss, 1983; Danziger, 1999).
The distinction between time- and state-dependent pricing schemes is of cru-
cial importance from the policy maker’s point of view. First, the output effects
of monetary shocks are typically stronger and longer lasting for time-dependent
models relative to state-dependent models (Dotsey et al., 1999; Golosov and
Lucas, 2007; Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Midrigan, 2011). Second, the welfare
implications, measured by minimizing an objective function which is quadratic
in inflation and the output gap (Woodford, 2003), under both schemes generally
do not coincide (Lombardo and Vestin, 2008).3
Our empirical approach is based on the semiparametric estimation of a so-
3This holds even true for the comparison of Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982) pricing, which
up to a first-order approximation around the zero inflation steady state, result in observation-
ally equivalent reduced-form macroeconomic dynamics (Roberts, 1995).
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called functional coefficient model. This allows to express functional depen-
dence of parameters on observable factor variables (Cai et al., 2000). This
method enables us to test for state-dependence of the Calvo parameter. An
important advantage of this approach is that we can draw inference on the
state-dependence of the pricing scheme by taking potential heteroscedasticity
of the disturbances into account. This is required in models which relate price
adjustment to inflation or IU , since such processes are characterized by con-
ditional heteroscedasticity (Sims, 2001). If prices are more flexible at higher
inflation rates or IU , this is likely reflected in the conditional volatility of in-
flation (Cogley and Sargent, 2005; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez,
2007). To address residual heteroscedasticity in the inference process regard-
ing functional dependence, we make use of the recently proposed factor-based
bootstrap (Herwartz and Xu, 2009). This scheme resamples factor observations
in contrast to drawing from the residuals as it is common, e.g. in the typically
employed residual bootstrap. We describe the bootstrap scheme in detail after
the introduction of the estimation method.
5.3 Empirical Approach
5.3.1 Data
The data set comprises quarterly observations of real output, the implicit out-
put deflator, and unit labor costs for N = 14 advanced economies, namely
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
from 1961Q3 to 2011Q4 taken from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 90.
All series are seasonally adjusted. Inflation is defined as quarterly percentage
change, i.e. pit = 400 × (pt − pt−1) with pt denoting the natural logarithm of
the implicit output deflator and t = 1, ..., T representing the time instances be-
tween 1961Q3 and 2011Q4, i.e. T = 201. Since real marginal costs mct are
unobservable, we follow the suggestion of Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and use the
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labor’s share of income st as proxy instead, i.e. mct = st. The labor’s share of
income is equivalent to real unit labor costs and in log-linearized terms given by
st = ulct − pt, with ulct being nominal unit labor cost. Finally, we follow the
mainstream procedure in the macroeconomic literature on estimating NKPC
and generate the output gap y˜t = yt − y¯t by applying the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600 to the series of real output yt, which
obtains the long-run trend estimate y¯t (Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999; Gal´ı et al., 2001).
5.3.2 Model Framework
Recent microeconometric studies on pricing behavior show that neither time-
dependent nor state-dependent models alone are capable of fully replicating the
various patterns of price movements in the data (Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008;
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Klenow and Malin, 2010). Nevertheless, the
majority of monetary policy analysis is conducted in NKMs resting on purely
time-dependent pricing mechanisms such as the prominent Calvo (1983) stag-
gered pricing scheme (e.g. Clarida et al., 1999; Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003;
Smets and Wouters, 2003; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007a; among others).
According to the Calvo scheme, each period individual firms have a certain
probability (1 − θ) to be allowed to reset their price, while with probability θ
they have to remain their previous price. In the aggregate, such pricing behav-
ior leads to the New Keynesian recitation of the Phillips curve, which relates
inflation to expected future inflation and a measure of real marginal costs
pˇit = βEtpˇit+1 +
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
mˇct, (5.1)
where pˇit denotes inflation, mˇct represents real marginal costs and β < 1 is
a discount factor. Moreover, the Calvo probability θ ∈ [0, 1] determines the
degree of price inertia, where θ = 0, 1 refers to cases of fully flexible and fully
rigid prices, respectively. In the model of Calvo (1983), the average duration of
non-adjustment amounts to a fixed spell of 1/(1− θ) quarters for the aggregate
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price level. Substitution of the expectation error εt = β[Et[pˇit+1]− pˇit+1] under
rational expectation yields
pˇit = βpˇit+1 +
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
sˇt + εt, (5.2)
In the framework of the NKPC, both, the specification in equation (5.2) and the
shorthand representation, which is obtained by letting κ ≡ ((1− θ)(1− θβ))/θ,
have an economic interpretation. Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) refer to κ as a “reduced
form” parameter and distinguish this quantity from the “structural” coefficients
of the NKPC from equation (5.2). As the term “structural” indicates, the price
adjustment speed parameter θ is treated as a constant, i.e. θ is assumed to be
independent of any economic fundamentals. However, allowing the frequency of
price adjustment to co-vary with economic fundamentals influences the reduced
form parameter κ and thus leads to a change in the sensitivity of inflation to
innovations in real marginal cost (Gertler and Leahy, 2008) and hence to changes
in the central banks ability to stabilize inflation via the nominal interest rate.
To allow for such non-constant behavior of the Calvo parameter, we employ
a state-dependent NKPC, where the frequency of price adjustment depends
on economic fundamentals rather than solely on time. The result is that the
Calvo parameter θ(ω) is a function of ω, where ω represents potential factors
variables. The simplest way to introduce such state-dependence into the Calvo
(1983) mechanism is to allow firms to choose their optimal stochastic arrival rate
θ, given a cost of changing price. Such an approach has been introduced, among
others, by Romer (1990), Kiley (2000), Devereux and Yetman (2002), and Levin
and Yun (2007). In this context the authors derive a state-dependent Calvo
parameter θ(pi), with ∂θ(pi)∂(pi) < 0 (Bakhshi et al., 2007b).
4 Bakhshi et al. (2007a)
show that the Calvo purely time-dependent NKPC, equation (5.1), is a special
case of a more general Calvo state-dependent NKPC with θ(ω). Therefore, we
apply the generalization θ(ω) to equation (5.1) and refer to equation (5.3) as
4A related widespread approach to derive a state-dependent NKPC based on the Calvo mech-
anism is presented by Dotsey et al. (1999).
5. State-dependence vs. Time-dependence 71
our state-dependent NKPC. Thus, equation (5.3) reads
pˇit = βpˇit+1 +
(1− θ(ω))(1− θ(ω)β)
θ(ω)
sˇt + εt, (5.3)
where ω = (w(1), w(2)), i.e. we allow for bivariate state-dependence of the
Calvo parameter. This formulation may be employed to detect changes in firms’
price setting behavior which are driven by potential factor variables w
(•)
t , where
’• = 1, 2’ indicates (1) lagged inflation pit−1 and (2) lagged inflation uncertainty
IUt−1. Inflation uncertainty is defined as IUt−1 = |∆pit−1| = |pit−1 − pit−2|,
i.e. the absolute error of the inflation forecast from a random walk model.
Such predictions are frequently found to obtain superior predictive performance
as compared to other inflation forecasting schemes (Canova, 2007; Stock and
Watson, 2007, 2008). To account for different scales of the inflation and IU
processes, w
(•)
t is considered in standardized form, i.e. w
(•)
t = w˜
(•)
t /σ(w˜) with
σ(w˜) denoting the standard error of w˜
(•)
t .
To examine the potential factor dependence of the Calvo parameter θ, the
influence of pˇit+1 on pˇit and mˇct is accounted for by means of a partial regression
step prior to the introduction of the state-dependent NKPC. To isolate the
effect of pˇit+1 on mˇct, we let mˇc = (mˇc1, ..., mˇcT )
′, pˇi = (pˇi1, ..., pˇiT )′, and
pˇi+ = (pˇi2, ..., pˇiT+1)
′, assuming that one additional observation is available.
Then, mc = (IT − pˇi+(pˇi′+pˇi+)−1pˇi′+)mˇc where IT denotes the identity matrix
of dimension T , whereas pi = pˇi − βpˇi+ may be obtained by presetting β =
0.99. Such magnitudes of the discount parameter β are commonly calibrated
for quarterly data (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Altig et al., 2005; Sbordone, 2005;
Dufour et al., 2006). Estimation of β also yields values close to 0.99 (Gal´ı and
Gertler, 1999; Dufour et al., 2006). Accounting for the effect of pit+1 in this
way results in an equivalent representation of equation (5.3). The condensed
representation is advantageous since we focus on the state-dependence of θ. The
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state-dependent NKPC is given by
pit =
(1− θ(ω))(1− βθ(ω))
θ(ω)
mct + et, (5.4)
where et denotes the error term in the regression after controlling for the effect
of pˇit+1 on pˇit and mˇct.
5.3.3 Estimation
Estimation of the factor dependent price adjustment frequency proceeds in anal-
ogy to the semiparametric Nadaraya Watson estimation method (Nadaraya,
1964; Watson, 1964). Thereby, we express functional dependence of the price ad-
justment parameter on pit−1 and IUt−1. Apart from potential state-dependence,
the employed estimation procedure has to take account of the potential endo-
geneity of mct, which is standard practice in the related literature, where esti-
mation of the NKPC is discussed (see Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999; Sbordone, 2005;
and the references therein). The estimation of the NKPC commonly proceeds
by means of the generalized method of moments (GMM). In the framework of
the functional coefficient model (5.4), we account for regressor endogeneity by
estimating θ(ω) according to
θˆ(ω) = arg min
θ
q(θ,Kh(ω)), (5.5)
with q(·) denoting the GMM objective function
q(θ,Kh, ω) = m¯(·)′Φm¯(·), (5.6)
where Kh(u) = K(u/h)/h, with K(·) being a kernel function depending on the
so-called bandwidth parameter h > 0. Moreover, Φ represents a positive definite
weighting matrix and m¯(·) is shorthand for the (empirical) moment condition
m¯(θ,Kh, ω) = (1/T )
T∑
t=1
ztetKh(w
(1)
t − w(1))Kh(w(2)t − w(2)). (5.7)
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In equation (5.7), zt represents a vector of instrument variables.
5.3.4 Implementation
Theoretical descriptions of how price adjustment responds to pi or IU suggest
that nominal rigidity is decreasing for higher inflation rates and in cases of ris-
ing IU (Ball et al., 1988). If the response of θ to pi or IU is not excessively
volatile, observations w
(•)
t near point w
(•) should be informative for the value of
the functional θ(w(1), w(2)) near w(•) (Eubank, 1988; Ha¨rdle, 1990). The closer
observations w
(•)
t are to a point w
(•), the more informative they will typically
be regarding the behavior of the functional θ(ω) near w(•). These differences in
the predictive content are incorporated in the estimation by means of the kernel
function, which puts higher relative weight on those observations in proximity
to w(•). In equation (5.4), the relation between pit and mct is evaluated in a
neighborhood of ω by means of the kernel weighting function Kh(·). Estimation
of θˆ(ω) yields local averages of the hypothesized state-dependent relation. An
important part of semiparametric regression is the choice of h. This parameter
determines how the tradeoff between unbiasedness and efficiency of estimation
is addressed. While smaller bandwidths tend to increase the variability of esti-
mates, larger values may hide local characteristics of the relation between θ and
ω. For increasing h, θˆ(ω) approaches the limit of the usual time-invariant GMM
estimate. This highlights that the functional coefficient method is suitable to
contrast systematic variation in θ from time invariance, since the NKPC under
the latter assumption is nested in the state-dependent regression model (5.4).
We choose the bandwidth according to Scott’s rule of thumb (Scott, 1992), which
obtains as h = 1.06T−1/5, since the factor variables are considered in standard-
ized form. We employ the logistic Kernel, i.e. K(u) = Λ(u)/(1 − Λ(u)), where
Λ(u) = 1/(1+exp(−u)). For the graphical display of the functional dependence,
θ(w(1) = v(1), w(2) = v(2)) is evaluated at particular states (v(1), v(2)) from the
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Fig. 5.1: Inflation rates and IU : Smoothed empirical densities of factor observations
equidistant grid
v(•) = c(•)lo , c
(•)
lo + kL(•), ..., c(•)up , k = 1, 2, ... , (5.8)
where c
(•)
lo , c
(•)
up denote lower and the upper quantiles of the factor observations
w
(•)
t , t = 1, ..., T and L(•) determines the step length. Particular choices of
quantiles from w
(•)
t , t = 1, ..., T , are determined to facilitate the graphical
exposition and numerical accuracy of results. Functional coefficient estimates
feature highest local efficiency at the center of a (unimodal) empirical factor
distribution. In our case, the sample period covers observations from higher
inflation regimes from the more distant past. Corresponding levels of pi have
only in few instances been observed during recent times. A choice of {clo, cup} =
{0.2, 0.8} determines a range of inflation and IU which is currently observed in
most advanced economies. This can be seen from Figure 5.1, where estimates of
the empirical density function of inflation are depicted. In the left plot, density
estimates for piit, i = 1, ..., 14, t = 1, ..., T are shown. The plot on the right
shows respective kernel estimates for the IU series. Dashed lines indicate the
cutoff points, which are determined as {clo, cup} = {0.01, 0.8} as a suitable range
of IU for which local dependence of θ is examined.
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5.3.5 Inference
In the framework of the functional coefficient NKPC, we intend to test if the
adjustment parameter is constant or state-dependent. In the literature on func-
tional coefficient estimation, such tests are routinely implemented by means of
bootstrap approaches, i.e. by resampling from the disturbance term (Cai et
al., 2000). The conclusions drawn from this resampling scheme, however, might
be affected by heteroscedasticity in the disturbances (Herwartz and Xu, 2009).
This is particularly relevant, since changes in the variance of inflation series over
time are empirically well documented for a wide range of economies (Engle, 1982;
Hartmann and Herwartz, 2012). For this reason, we employ the so-called factor-
based bootstrap as suggested by Herwartz and Xu (2009), which is designed to
circumvent the problems encountered by residual-based resampling procedures
in case of heteroscedastic disturbances.
1. Functional coefficients evaluated at particular realizations of the data and
for a given choice of h may be described as
θˆ(ω) = θ
(
pit,mct, ωt = (w
(1)
t , w
(2)
t ), h, t = 1, ..., T
)
. (5.9)
2. To distinguish state-dependence from structural constancy in the pricing
scheme, local estimates θˆ(ω) are compared to their bootstrap counterparts
θˆ∗(ω) = θ
(
pit,mct, ω
∗
t = (w
(1∗)
t , w
(2∗)
t ), h, t = 1, ..., T
)
, (5.10)
with binary tuples (w
(1∗)
t , w
(2∗)
t ) being drawn with replacement from the
factor observations (w
(1)
t , w
(2)
t ).
3. A large number as, e.g. R = 1000 resampling estimates θˆ∗(ω) obtains the
bootstrap distribution of θˆ∗(ω). The corresponding confidence interval is
employed to assess the local state-dependence of θ(ω). In this study, we
reject state-invariance at the 10 percent level, if θˆ(ω) is either below the 5
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percent or above the 95 percent-quantile of the bootstrap distribution at
any level of the factor variables.
As it can be seen from step number 2 as described above, in this approach,
the bootstrap confidence intervals are obtained by imposing H0 “directly” dur-
ing the bootstrap, i.e. we distort the relation between θ and the factor observa-
tions in ω and thereby guarantee that H0 : θ(ω) = θ∀ω holds irrespectively of
potential heterogeneity in the errors (or the factor observations).
5.4 Results
In the following, we report estimates and test outcomes for the state-dependence
of θ and we comment on the magnitudes and economic plausibility of implied
estimates of the NKPC relation. Results obtained by means of pooled panel
estimation, where observations for all economies are jointly considered are also
reported. In the literature it is well documented that the considered economies
feature distinctive characteristics, particularly with respect to different levels of
inflation or IU (Judson and Orphanides, 1999; Caporale and Kontonikas, 2009).
Therefore, the conventional pooled estimation framework might be regarded as
rather restrictive. However, the functional coefficient representation captures in-
dividual economies’ idiosyncratic characteristics through the influence of factor
variables. This introduces considerable flexibility also in the pooled estimation
setting.
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show estimates obtained according to equation
(5.5) for the United States and the pooled sample. Solid lines represent the
estimates θˆ, dashed lines stand for 90 percent bootstrap confidence intervals.
The latter are obtained according to the factor-based bootstrap as described
in Section 5.3.5. Local state-dependence at particular factor levels is indicated
if estimates are outside the interval. For clarity, we present only a subset of
estimates from the entire range of the factor space. Dependence of θ on one
of the factors is plotted conditional on a certain level of the respective other
5. State-dependence vs. Time-dependence 77
UNITED STATES
θ
=
θ
(pi
|IU
=
c l
o
)
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
θ
=
θ
(pi
|IU
=
m
ed
)
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
θ
=
θ
(pi
|IU
=
c u
p
)
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
pi pi pi
θ
=
θ
(I
U
|pi
=
c l
o
)
0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
θ
=
θ
(I
U
|pi
=
m
ed
)
0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
θ
=
θ
(I
U
|pi
=
c u
p
)
0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
IU IU IU
POOLED SAMPLE
θ
=
θ
(pi
|IU
=
c l
o
)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
θ
=
θ
(pi
|IU
=
m
ed
)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
θ
=
θ
(pi
|IU
=
c u
p
)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
pi pi pi
θ
=
θ
(I
U
|pi
=
c l
o
)
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
θ
=
θ
(I
U
|pi
=
m
ed
)
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
θ
=
θ
(I
U
|pi
=
c u
p
)
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
IU IU IU
Fig. 5.2: Functional coefficient estimates for the United States and the pooled sample
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Fig. 5.3: Surface plots for the United States (left) and the pooled sample (right)
factor. For example, θ = θ(pi|IU = cup) means that potentially inflation-induced
variation in θ is depicted for an IU level equal to the upper quantile of the IU
series.
The estimates θˆ in Figure 5.2 reinstate the theoretical prediction that ∂θ(ω)∂pi<0 ,
i.e. the frequency of price adjustment increases for higher inflation rates. This
finding is also in line with recent evidence from Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)
and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). In contrast, we do not find evidence for a
uniform sign of the IU impact. This is in line with the discussion in Be´nabou
(1992), where both signs are described as plausible. As a robustness check, we
also obtain estimates of Calvo parameters based on data for the remaining 13
single economies. For 10 out of 13 economies, an impact of either pi or IU on
θ is detected. Only for Canada, Italy and Finland, the H0 of a constant Calvo
pricing scheme cannot be rejected.
In Figure 5.3, surface plots for the United States and the pooled estimate
are depicted to provide an impression on the joint impact of pi and IU on θ.
Surfaces for the remaining individual economies are qualitatively similar and
not reported to economize on space. Both plots of Figure 5.3 show that while θ
takes an initially high level for low inflation rates, the estimates drop at interme-
diate levels of pi around 3 percent. In case of the pooled estimate, the updating
frequency is less responsive for much higher pi. At first, the price inertia for val-
ues of pi which are currently observed in most advanced economies might appear
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ARCH(1) ARCH(4) J × 103 ARCH(1) ARCH(4) J × 103
AT 41.70 52.07 0.09 JP 18.89 26.01 0.01
BE 9.24 24.41 0.01 NL 32.37 111.74 0.32
CA 28.61 33.40 0.03 NZ 41.31 53.47 7.21
ES 34.94 42.81 0.01 PT 38.44 52.26 0.04
FN 74.89 102.17 0.97 SW 76.26 81.09 0.01
FR 42.67 51.31 0.51 UK 77.99 79.46 0.00
IT 26.25 42.10 0.12 US 43.99 51.42 0.01
Tab. 5.1: Regression diagnostics
relatively high. This is in contrast to micro-price studies which find averagely
fixed prices between one and two quarters (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Klenow and
Kryvtsov, 2008; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Klenow and Malin, 2010). One
reason for this divergence is the use of different observational frequencies. While
the above mentioned studies use monthly consumer price index time series in
their estimations, this paper applies quarterly aggregates of the GDP deflator.
Ellis (2009) and Abe and Tonogi (2010) show that lower frequency data leads to
larger estimates of price stickiness by construction. Micro-price studies at very
high frequencies, such as weekly or even daily, report price spells of less than a
quarter (Kehoe and Midrigan, 2007; Ellis, 2009; Abe and Tonogi, 2010; Cavallo,
2012). Moreover, estimating a high-frequency NKPC, Chapter 4 of this thesis
shows that also on the macro level higher-frequency data leads to lower average
price spells.
The magnitude of θ, however, is close to estimates reported in other stud-
ies which investigate aggregate pricing (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Levin et
al., 2006; Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2007; Nason and Smith, 2008; Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez, 2010). The influence of IU on θ is in both cases
confined to moderate inflation rates. However, this range of inflation is also
currently most frequently observed. Whereas higher IU leads to decreasing θ
in the United States for low pi, the effect is ambiguous in case of the pooled
estimate. This suggests that IU influences θ in a rather idiosyncratic way.
In Table 5.1, diagnostic test statistics are summarized. These statistics are
obtained for estimates of equation (5.2) assuming no state-dependence of θ.
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Columns 1-2 and 4-5 report ARCH-LM test statistics (Engle, 1982) for the
residuals from estimation of equation (5.2) with q = 1, 4 denoting the lag order
of squared disturbances. These ARCH-LM tests confirm the presence of condi-
tional heteroscedasticity in the residuals for each considered economy. Our find-
ings are in line with the findings of Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez
(2010), who point out that ARCH-effects might lead to spurious conclusions re-
garding state-dependence or dynamics in θ. Similarly, residual-based bootstrap
methods as considered by, e.g., Cai et al. (2000) are unreliable in cases when
disturbances feature ARCH dynamics (Herwartz and Xu, 2009). In such a situ-
ation, the factor-based bootstrap approach might be a more suitable means to
draw inference on functional dependence of coefficients. Furthermore, Columns
3 and 6 report J-t est statistics for overidentifying restrictions in the GMM
estimation procedure. The J-statistics in Table 5.1 indicate no evidence against
the null hypothesis of joint exogeneity of the instrument variable (IV) set. We
choose zt = (y˜t−1, y˜t−2)′ as instrument variables, a subset of the instrument
variables considered by, e.g. Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), where y˜t = yt− y¯t denotes
the output gap, i.e. the deviation of gross domestic product yt from its long
term trend y¯t.
With 2 instrument variables, the J-test for overidentification adheres to a
χ2(1) distribution under H0 of at least one of the instrument variables being
exogenous. Depending on initial examination of the J-statistic, we determine
the IV set alternatively as zt = y˜t−1 in cases where exogeneity is rejected.
A further way to assess the plausibility of the obtained estimates is to
examine the magnitude and significance of the reduced-form parameter κ ≡
((1 − θ)(1 − θβ))/θ. A puzzling finding of many studies, where similar to Gal´ı
and Gertler (1999) the labor’s share of income is employed as an explanatory
variable in the structural NKPC is that estimates of κ are insignificant or even
have a theoretically implausible negative sign (Jondeau and Bihan, 2005; Rudd
and Whelan, 2005; Abbas and Sgro, 2011; Kuttner and Robinson, 2012).
Table 5.2 shows reduced form Phillips curve estimates κ and corresponding
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κ t-stat. κ t-stat.
AT 0.01 0.01 JP 0.01 0.01
BE 0.02 0.02 NL 0.01 0.01
CA 0.01 0.01 NZ 0.02 0.11
ES 0.02 0.03 PT 0.02 0.25
FN 0.01 0.02 SW 0.03 0.02
FR 0.02 0.03 UK 0.05 0.06
IT 0.01 0.11 US 0.01 0.01
Tab. 5.2: Estimates for equation (5.2) (constant θ case)
t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors, as they are typi-
cally reported in related studies. For the economies we consider, the sign of the
Phillips curve relation is positive, as predicted by economic theory. The magni-
tudes of estimates are for all economies similar to the findings reported by Gal´ı
and Gertler (1999), Gal´ı et al. (2001), or Sbordone (2005), among many oth-
ers. Moreover, in line with existing empirical evidence, none of the coefficients
is statistically significant. Since disturbances are found to be heteroscedastic,
t-statistics are based on a robust covariance estimator (Newey and West, 1987).
The recurring finding of implausible NKPC parameter estimates has led to
doubts about the suitability of the labor’s share of income as a measure of
marginal costs (Wolman, 1999; Neiss and Nelson, 2002; Kiley, 2007). The criti-
cism put forth in these studies is also based on theoretical arguments. However,
Wolman (1999) and Gal´ı et al. (2005) point out that it might be the overly
restrictive assumption of a constant price updating frequency, as implied by the
Calvo (1983) scheme, that gives rise to estimation problems. This hypothesis
can be addressed by means of the functional coefficient framework. In analogy
to the investigation described above, we estimate the reduced-form NKPC, al-
lowing for state-dependence such that κ = κ(ω). Since functional dependence
of θ is detected in the majority of economies, the same might also hold for κ.5
Local estimates of κ and corresponding t-statistics for distinct levels of pi and
IU indicate if the generalization reinstates the theory with empirical NKPC
5Functional coefficient estimates which allow for state-dependence of both θ and the discount
parameter β suggest that β is not affected by either pi or IU . These results are not reported
in detail and might be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Fig. 5.4: State-dependent t-statistics for the reduced-form Phillips curve parameter κ
estimates. We find that allowing for state-dependence of κ obtains estimates at
similar magnitudes as reported in Table 5.2. The t-statistics are mostly higher
than their counterparts in Table 5.2 but are, however, throughout insignificant
also in this case. However, insufficient degrees of freedom might deteriorate
the power of t-tests regarding local semiparametric estimates to a larger extent
than in the parametric case. We, therefore, compare pooled estimates under the
assumption of a constant and state-dependent κ. As depicted in Figure 5.4, the
t-statistics for functional coefficient estimates of κ are highly significant over al-
most the entire range of the factor space. The respective state-invariant pooled
t-statistic, in contrast, is equal to tpooled = 1.04. Though significance tests for
individual economies are not rejected, these findings are at least an indication
that state-dependence is a meaningful generalization of the Calvo scheme.
For macroeconomic theory the results obtained above are particularly note-
worthy, since most studies on monetary policy are conducted in a time-dependent,
rather than a state-dependent, framework. The reason is straightforward: there
seems to be a widespread agreement in the literature that both approaches
are almost equivalent (Ascari and Rossi, 2012) and time-dependent models are
analytically simpler and much more tractable. The equivalency result is true,
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however, only under very restrictive assumptions. For instance, Roberts (1995)
shows that the standard approaches to time- and state-dependent pricing (which
are the time-dependent approaches by Taylor (1979) and Calvo (1983) and the
state-dependent approach by Rotemberg (1982)) yield observationally equiva-
lent reduced-form dynamics up to a first-order Taylor approximation around the
zero-inflation steady state. Ascari and Rossi (2012), however, show that this
does not hold true anymore in the presence of trend inflation. Also, the wel-
fare implications under these approaches, measured by minimizing an objective
function which is quadratic in inflation and the output gap (Woodford, 2003),
coincide up to a second-order Taylor approximation only as long as the steady
state is efficient6 (Nistico`, 2007; Lombardo and Vestin, 2008; Damjanovic and
Nolan, 2011).
Finally, the output effects of monetary shocks are typically stronger and
longer lasting for time-dependent models relative to state-dependent models
(Dotsey et al., 1999; Golosov and Lucas, 2007; Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Midri-
gan, 2011). Intuitively, the reason is straightforward. While a positive mone-
tary policy shock increases inflation, this in turn increases the price updating
frequency. With more prices being updated, the Phillips curve flattens and the
output reaction ceases. In time-dependent models, as noted, the average fre-
quency of nominal adjustment is independent of inflation. Additionally, state-
dependent models feature a selection effect, which is not met by time-dependent
models. In state-dependent models those firms change prices, whose prices are
most out of line. Therefore, nominal adjustments are quite large compared to
the adjustment under time-dependent models. Consequently, state-dependent
models feature a much stronger nominal flexibility (Caplin and Spulber, 1987;
Golosov and Lucas, 2007).
6In the sense that distortions from monopolistic competition are met by a subsidy to the firm,
which elevates the quantity supplied to the level under perfect competition.
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5.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, the method of functional coefficient regression is applied to
investigate on the state-dependence of the frequency of price updating. We
find that both the inflation rate and IU significantly affect aggregate price ad-
justment. Inference is based on a bootstrap methodology which is unaffected
by heteroscedasticity in the regression disturbances. Nonspherical disturbances
are described as a principal impediment to valid inference in previous empiri-
cal examinations of state-dependent pricing rules. We find that the updating
frequency increases at higher inflation rates. Moreover, functional coefficient
estimates of the Phillips curve relation are found to be more in line with theory
than estimates obtained under the assumption of constant coefficients. These
finding imply that the “deep parameter” interpretation of the standard Calvo
(1983) price setting scheme is a too restrictive assumption for actual price set-
ting behavior.
Our results are of particular importance for the conduct of monetary pol-
icy analysis. First, the welfare implications under time- and state-dependent
approaches coincide only under the very restrictive assumption of an efficient
steady state, which is unlikely to be met. Second, output effects of monetary
shocks are typically stronger and longer lasting for time-dependent models rel-
ative to state-dependent models. Therefore, the correct application of time-
or state-dependent pricing schemes to the particular economy of interest is of
crucial importance from the policy maker’s point of view.
6. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
This thesis has taken alternative views on preferences and nominal rigidities
and their interaction with monetary policy.
In the theoretical part of this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) we show that an
alternative view on preferences allows us to provide rationales for long-run effects
of monetary policy and endogenous price stickiness.
In particular, Chapter 2 has incorporated inequality aversion into an other-
wise standard DSGE model with staggered, monopolistically competitive nom-
inal wage contracts. In this context, we have derived a backward-bending long-
run Phillips curve, so that increases in money growth lead to higher employment
and output at low inflation, but to lower employment and output at high infla-
tion. We show that the welfare maximizing inflation rate is just under 2 percent.
This result is striking since the mainstream literature on optimal monetary pol-
icy places the optimal inflation rate in the range between zero and a negative
number (minus the real interest rate, as implied by the Friedman rule). Endog-
enizing the probability of wage adjustment does not restore monetary long-run
neutrality, as long as wage changes are costly. Furthermore, the tradeoff re-
mains robust to variations in the price adjustment scheme and the specification
of inequality aversion. Clearly, envy and guilt are not the only behavioral mo-
tives entering the utility function of homo-sociologicus. Further research will
include analyzing other important motives such as status preferences or pride
with regard to their explanatory power of the long-run neutrality puzzle.
Chapter 3 has incorporated consumer loss aversion in the price dimension
into an otherwise standard neoclassical model of monopolistic competition. The
resulting theory of price adjustment is starkly at variance with past neoclassical
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and Keynesian theories. We have shown that loss averse consumers generate
state-dependent price sluggishness in the form of asymmetric price adjustments.
In line with ample empirical evidence, we show that for permanent demand
shocks, output is more responsive to negative shocks than positive ones, but for
temporary shocks, output is more responsive to positive shocks. Standard time-
dependent and state-dependent models fail to account for these asymmetries.
Furthermore, in contrast to the standard time-dependent and state-dependent
models, our explanation of price adjustments is derived entirely from microfoun-
dations, without any recourse to ad hoc assumptions concerning the frequency
of price changes or physical costs of price adjustments. Clearly, loss aversion in
prices is only one aspect. It is easy to think of other aspects, households are
loss averse towards to. For instance, assuming that households or workers are
loss averse with respect to their nominal wages rather than prices, gives rise to
a rationale for downward nominal wage rigidity in response to permanent labor
demand shocks. We will analyze this phenomenon in a subsequent paper.
In the empirical part of this thesis, we have focused completely on the firm
side of the economy, represented by the NKPC. In Chapters 4 and 5, we propose
two alternative methods to estimate the structural short-run NKPC, to improve
the estimation procedure with the goal to realign the macroeconomic estimates
with microeconometric evidence.
In particular, Chapter 4 has estimated a higher-frequency NKPC. The esti-
mation on a higher observation frequency mitigates the small-sample bias and
avoids the overstatement of the true price stickiness, which arises from lower
frequency price aggregates. Our results are, again, in stark contrast to the
standard literature. While price stickiness estimated from quarterly macro data
often highly overstates price stickiness estimated from micro price data, our
high-frequency estimates from macro price data are consistent with estimates
from micro price data. With Argentine data from late 2007 to early 2011 we
have found that Argentine prices remain fixed - on average - for much less than
a quarter. This finding has immediate implications for monetary policy analy-
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sis in Argentina. For the case of Argentina, a quarterly model would need to
be calibrated as flexible price model, instead of a sticky price model. Alterna-
tively, to apply a sticky price model, it must be calibrated at most on a monthly
frequency. Whether this holds true for other economies (especially the United
States or the counties of the euro area) will be the focus of future research in
this area.
Finally, in Chapter 5 has empirically investigated the time-dependent and
state-dependent behavior of aggregate price setting, by implementing a testing
procedure by means of a nonparametric representation of the structural form
NKPC. By means of the so-called functional coefficient regression we have tested
for potential dependence of the Calvo parameter on inflation and inflation un-
certainty. We have confirmed that the Calvo scheme is a too restrictive model
of aggregate price setting. Furthermore, we have documented that a number
of shortcomings of empirical NKPC representations in explaining inflation data
may be addressed by means of a state-dependent pricing rule.
To summarize, taking an alternative view on preferences and nominal rigidi-
ties highly influences the way we think about monetary policy analysis. As
this thesis has shown, diverging from the standard assumption of the homo-
economicus, can have substantial effects on the incentive systems of economic
agents. Therefore, the results from this thesis issue a word of caution with re-
gard to the careless application of homo-economicus in economic analysis. As
indicated in the paragraphs above, much is left to be analyzed with respect
to the motivational underpinnings of economic agents’ preferences for macroe-
conomic phenomena. This will be subject of future research along the lines
presented in thesis.
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